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Appeals in Federal Courts by
Prosecuting Entities other than the
United States: The Plain Meaning
Rule Revisited
By R. RANDALL KELSO *
and C. KEVIN KELSO**
In the majority of criminal cases heard in federal district courts,
the prosecuting entity is the United States Government. If a district
court makes a ruling adverse to the United States,' the United States
may appeal to a court of appeals under 18 United States Code section
3731, which provides that the United States may appeal in a criminal
case as long as the double jeopardy clause is not violated.2
In the remainder of criminal cases tried in district courts, one of
two government entities other than the United States is the prosecutor:
a state government in an action removed by a federal defendant pursu-
ant to 28 United States Code section 1442(a), 3 or a territorial govern-
* J.S.D. Candidate, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1976, University of
Chicago; J.D., 1979, University of Wisconsin.
** B.A., 1975, University of Illinois; J.D., 1978, Harvard University. Member, Cali-
fornia Bar.
1. Typical examples of adverse rulings include orders dismissing one or more counts
of an indictment or information, orders suppressing or excluding evidence, and orders re-
quiring the return of seized property.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in part: "In a criminal case an appeal by the
United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district
court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no
appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
further prosecution .... The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effec-
tuate its purposes." (emphasis added). This section requires that the decision be final before
an appeal may be taken. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 707 n.23, 721 n.100 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "A civil action or criminal
prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the following persons may be re-
moved by them to the district court of the United States for the district and division embrac-
ing the place wherein it is pending: (1) Any officer of the United States or any agency
thereof, or person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or on an account
of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue." Thus, § 1442(a) permits a crimi-
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ment that has appealed to the appropriate district court from the
territorial court.4 Until quite recently, it was unclear whether appeals
by either of these prosecuting entities were statutorily authorized. The
statutory scheme arguably left states and territories unable to secure
appellate review in circumstances in which the United States, as the
prosecutor, easily could have secured review pursuant to section 3731.
No federal statute other than section 3731 had been held specifically to
authorize appeals by states or territories. The "plain meaning" rule of
statutory interpretation, which holds that the words in a statute should
be given their ordinary effect when the statute's meaning is plain, sug-
gested that section 3731 was inapplicable because it expressly author-
ized appeals only "by the United States."5
Moreover, the general appeals statute, 28 United States Code sec-
tion 1291,6 seemed inapplicable.7 Although section 1291 is the source
of appellate rights for defendants, its use as the sole basis of a state's
nal action commenced in a state court to be removed by defendants who are federal law
enforcement and revenue agencies, or federal officers.
4. Suits involving a territory may be in federal court by reason of an appeal from an
adverse decision from the territorial court to the district court pursuant to its own territorial
statutes. See, e.g., Government of Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529, 529-30 n. I (3d
Cir. 1973) (appeal under 48 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976)). If the district court also rules adversely,
the territory may seek to appeal that decision. See id. (appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1294
(1976)).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). See note 2 supra. This was the conclusion reached by the
Ninth Circuit in the only case to consider the problem, Arizona v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d
1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1657 (1981). See notes 27-31 infra.
A similar problem of interpretation arises under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1976). That statute
authorizes increased sentences for dangerous special offenders. See United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). It prescribes procedures for "the United States" and the
"defendant" to participate in special offender hearings, which may result in increased
sentences. Subsection (a) of the statute authorizes "an[y] attorney charged with the prosecu-
tion of a defendant in a court of the United States" to petition for a hearing, thus presuma-
bly including state or territorial prosecutors in federal court in removed criminal cases, while
the rest of the statute refers only to the "United States" as the prosecuting entity. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 3575(a) with § 3575(b). Both subsections refer to the same prosecutor; thus, this
statute may provide support for the conclusion that Congress considers the phrase "United
States" to be similar to the phrase "an[y] attorney . . . in a court of the United States,"
suggesting that state and territorial prosecutors in federal court should be granted rights and
have duties imposed on them under statutes using the phrase "United States," such as
§ 3731. See also text accompanying notes 221-236 infra.
The provision about the review of sentences accompanying § 3575, 18 U.S.C. § 3576,
poses the same question of what scope is to be given to the phrase "the United States."
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides in part: "The courts of appeals shall have juris-
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam,
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."
7. The Supreme Court has now held that § 1291, together with a specific state statu-
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right to appeal would conflict with the common law rule that the prose-
cution may not appeal from an adverse decision absent some specific
statutory authorization,8 and with Supreme Court decisions holding
that general appeals statutes are not sufficiently explicit to overcome
the common law rule.9
Denying a state the right to appeal in such circumstances would
create serious and obvious anomalies. The United States as prosecutor
could appeal adverse decisions of district court judges, and a state as a
prosecutor in its own state courts often could appeal adverse decisions
of trial judges pursuant to state statutes,' 0 but when the state was the
tory authorization, could provide a basis for states to appeal. Arizona v. Manypenny, 101 S.
Ct. 1657 (1981). See notes 41-53 & accompanying text infra.
8. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977); United States
v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312, 318-23
(1892). See generally Caruso, Double Jeopardy and Government Appeals in Criminal Cases,
12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 295 (1976); Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals
by the Government in Criminal Cases, 80 DICK. L. REV. 525 (1976); Comment, Double Jeop-
ardy and Government Appeals of Criminal Dismissals, 52 TX. L. REv. 303 (1974); Note,
Limited Right of Appealfor the State, 14 Hous. L. REV. 735 (1977).
9. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310, 323 (1892).
State prosecutors also might argue that, even if these statutes do not authorize an ap-
peal, a writ of mandamus should lie under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976). This argument would
appear to have little chance of success. "Government appeal in the federal courts [in crimi-
nal cases has been] limited by Congress [by 18 U.S.C. § 3731] and the Criminal Appeals Act
is strictly construed against the Government's right of appeal. Mandamus, of course, may
never be employed as a substitute for appeal in derogation of these clear policies. Nor is the
case against permitting [mandamus] 'made less compelling. . . by the fact that the Govern-
ment has no later right to appeal.'" Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1967).
Mandamus may, however, be used to review procedural orders in criminal cases. The
Court noted in Will that "lilt has been invoked successfully where the action of the trial
court [denied] the Government the rightful fruits of a valid conviction." Id at 97-98 (citing
Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916)). Although at first glance Exparte United States
may appear favorable to permitting mandamus, it involved an extreme case of an unconsti-
tutional suspension of the imposition of a sentence. 242 U.S. at 37, 51-52. See also Mary-
land v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926) (mandamus relief awarded after the state challenged
the legality of removing a criminal prosecution to federal court), discussed in Arizona v.
Manypenny, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1667 n.25 (1981). Furthermore, the Second Circuit specifically
has held that mandamus may not be used to circumvent the limitations of § 3731. United
States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally French, The Frontiers of
the Federal Mandamus Statute, 21 VILL. L. REV. 637, 672-73 (1976) (relief under the manda-
mus statute should be broader, but the mandamus statute has been put to "narrow use...
in the modem era by American courts").
10. Only three states-Texas, Georgia, and Nevada-allow prosecutors no right of ap-
peal from adverse trial court judgments in criminal cases. Note, Limited Right ofAppealFor
the State, 14 Hous. L. REv. 735, 737 (1977). Three other states--Connecticut, Vermont,
and Wisconsin-allow its prosecutors a right of appeal equal in scope to that of the defend-
ant. Id Other states limit the state's right of appeal in some way, such as to questions of
law or pretrial motions. Id
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prosecutor in a federal court because the defendant removed the case,
or when a territory sought review from a territorial district court,
neither could appeal.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered this problem inArizona v. Manypenny.12 In a case of first impres-
sion,' 3 a divided panel decided that a state could not appeal from an
11. It is at least arguable that this result violates the equal protection clause. It is diffi-
cult to imagine what policy is rationally served by permitting federal prosecutors, but not
state prosecutors, to appeal in removed criminal cases. The result does not seem rationally
related to any policy regarding the removal procedure. See note 180 infra. Unless federal
prosecutors are to be trusted more than state prosecutors with an appellate right, or removed
criminal cases are substantively different from federal criminal actions in a way that would
make appellate rights appropriate only in federal actions, it is difficult to justify disparate
treatment between the two prosecutorial classes.
Only a rational relationship between the statutory scheme and a legitimate government
purpose is required to justify the disparate treatment. Congress can attack only part of a
problem, the right of federal prosecutors to appeal, however, because no suspect class is
involved. See Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections. An Equal Protection Analysis,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1491, 1492-1503 (1980). Thus, an equal protection violation might be
quite difficult to prove. It has been noted that examination under the rational basis test may
result in a finding of "virtually none" at all. Id. at 1492.
12. 608 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1657 (1981). At issue in Manypenny,
was a state's right to appeal from an adverse district court ruling in a removed criminal
proceeding, but the right of a territory to appeal would seem to be guided by the same
principles. The only difference would be that a territorial prosecutor denied the right to
appeal from an adverse district court ruling would have already had an appeal from the
territorial court to the district court, while a state prosecutor denied the right to appeal from
the district court would have no appellate right at all. The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1976), granting appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States,
and 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), granting appeals to the United States, would seem, however, to
apply to both states and territories. It would be anomalous to grant either state or territorial
prosecutors the right to appeal under § 1291's authorization of appeals from "all final deci-
sions" or under § 3731 without extending the right to appeal to the other prosecutorial
group. One commentator, however, has suggested that the two situations are distinguisha-
ble. Note, Criminal Appellate Procedure-State Right to Appeal in a Criminal Case Removed
to Federal Court-Arizona v. Manypenny, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REv. 1006, 1007 n.8. It may also be
argued that the more extensive federal involvement with territories justifies interpreting the
language of § 3731 referring to "the United States" to apply only to territories and not to
states.
13. The right of a state to appeal in a removed criminal prosecution does not seem to
have been squarely addressed prior to Manypenny. In North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129
(4th Cir. 1967), a civil proceeding had been commenced in state court between two private
parties. The state ordered a federal officer, Carr, to testify at the civil proceeding and pro-
duce material relating to his investigation of the disputed incident. Officer Carr refused
pursuant to instructions from the Attorney General of the United States. As a result, he was
cited for contempt. Id at 130. Officer Carr sought to remove the contempt proceeding to
the federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). The district court held that the
case was removable and that the order of contempt was invalid because Officer Carr had
been acting pursuant to an order of the Attorney General. North Carolina appealed from
this decision. The district court had stated that the contempt proceeding was criminal in
nature. The court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide whether the proceeding was
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
PLAIN MEANING RULE
adverse decision in a removed criminal prosecution. 14 The United
'States Supreme Court reversed, grounding a state's right to appeal in
the general appeals statute, 28 United States Code section 1291.15
Manypenny raises two questions. The first is whether the right to
appeal of states and territories in criminal cases heard in federal courts
should differ from the right of the United States. The second is when a
civil or criminal, or whether an appeal from such an action should be allowed, because the
civil action was settled during the pendency of the appeal and the case was dismissed as
moot. Id at 130-31.
One reason this issue has remained unsettled may be that states rarely institute criminal
proceedings against persons able to invoke the removal statutes-federal law enforcement
and revenue agencies, federal officials, and property holders whose title was derived from
the federal government. See note 3 supra. A federal official, for example, has complete
immunity against civil actions based on state law if he or she is acting within the perameters
of his or her authority, and also has at least a qualified immunity against criminal prosecu-
tions based on state law. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Miller v. DeLaune,
602 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1979); Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (D. Ariz.
1977) (citing Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1977)). Thus, appeals following removal
are likely only when the federal official's conduct is so flagrant that immunity does not bar
the suit, when the district judge holds that the defendant is immune and the state wishes to
appeal this decision, or when the official failed to raise the immunity defense. See generally
Note, Governmenallmmunit--Ci'ilRights-Constitutional Law-Scope ofImmunity Avail-
able to Federal Executive Officials, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 604. A second reason may be that
when these cases have been tried, state prosecutors have not been faced with prejudicial
adverse rulings creating the need to appeal.
The right of a territorial prosecutor to appeal from an adverse district court ruling has
been discussed by two courts. In Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1973),
the court relied on the necessity for specific authorization of an appeal by the government in
a criminal case and refused to permit the government of the Virgin Islands to appeal an
adverse decision from the territorial district court to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The government sought to rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as authority for its appeal, but the court
concluded that the section did not provide specific authorization. The court found its con-
clusion reinforced by the fact that, under the local law of the Virgin Islands, the government
would not have been permitted to appeal the decision in question from the trial court to the
territorial district court. The opinion did not, however, analyze the reasons why the local
law of the Virgin Islands was relevant to determining the government's right to appeal from
the district court to the court of appeals. Neither the government nor the court discussed
whether § 3731 authorized the appeal on the theory that the words "United States" should
be interpreted to include territorial governments. Id at 529-30.
In a second case, Guam v. Olsen, 81 Daily J. D.A.R. 1041 (9th Cir., April 9, 1981), the
court denied the Guam territorial prosecutor a right to appeal, tracking the arguments of the
Ninth Circuit majority opinion in Manypenny. The court concluded that, even if Guam
could appeal in its own court, § 1291's general authorization for appeals coupled with spe-
cific territorial authority could not overcome the requirement of "express statutory author-
ity" for a government appeal in a criminal case. Id at 1041. Presumably, in the wake of the
Supreme Court's reversal of Manypenny on this ground, see notes 41-53 & accompanying
text infra, this decision is no longer good law. While Manypenny concerned only the rights
of states to appeal, the same considerations are applicable to territorial entities. See note 12
supra. -
14. 608 F.2d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1657 (1981).
15. 101 S. Ct. 1657 (1981). See notes 41-53 infra.
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statute's plain meaning should be abandoned to allow a court to reach
a rational result.
The first section of this Article discusses the first question raised by
Manypenny regarding the right of states and territories to appeal and
analyzes the need for a theory of statutory interpretation to answer this
question. The next two sections of this Article address the second,
broader issue raised by Manypenny and suggest a theory governing the
application of the plain meaning rule and the adoption of the statute's
plain meaning.16 The Article then demonstrates this theory by apply-
ing it to the Manypenny problem.17 Finally, the Article discusses the
relationship between this approach to statutory interpretation and the
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit opinions.
Defining the Problem
The Background of the Right to Appeal in Criminal Cases
The Supreme Court established the framework for analyzing the
federal government's right to appeal in criminal cases in federal court
in its 1892 decision, United States v. Sanges.'8 In Sanges, the Supreme
Court concluded that, absent express statutory authorization, the
United States could not appeal from a judgment in favor of a criminal
defendant.' 9 The Court relied on two grounds. First, the Court found
that, under English and American common law, the government could
not appeal from adverse decisions in criminal cases. 20 Second, the
16. Throughout this Article, a distinction is drawn between the plain meaning rule and
the plain meaning of the statute. The difference is that the plain meaning rule provides a
framework within which statutory interpretation questions are to be considered, but does
not mandate that the plain meaning of the statute always be adopted. For example, even the
most traditional formulation of the plain meaning rule allows a court to depart from the
plain meaning of the statute when application of that meaning would be absurd. See note 99
& accompanying text infra.
17. As similar policies affect whether state or territorial prosecutors should be allowed
to appeal, see note 12 supra, this Article discusses only the question raised by Manypenny of
the right of state prosecutors to appeal.
If an appeal right for state prosecutors were found, the question would arise whether
permitting the government to appeal in a Manypenny situation would violate the double
jeopardy clause. This issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See Arizona v. Manypenny,
608 F.2d at 1203-05 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding that the double jeopardy clause
would not be violated).
18. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
19. Id at 312, 323.
20. Id at 312-18. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to decisions of several
state supreme courts for guidance. Id These courts had denied state governments the right
to seek review of adverse trial court rulings in state appellate courts when there was no state
statute permitting an appeal. Id Although it noted that the American practice was not
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Court concluded that the Judiciary Act of 1891,21 the only relevant stat-
utory authority and the precursor of 28 United States Code section
1291,22 did not provide the necessary express authority.23
Fifteen years after the Court's decision in Sanges, Congress passed
the first Criminal Appeals Act.24 This statute permitted the United
States to appeal a dismissal of an indictment or a decision arresting
judgment that involved the validity or construction of a statute under
which the defendant had been prosecuted.25 In 1971, Congress passed
a new Criminal Appeals Act that permits the United States to appeal in
any instance in which the double jeopardy clause would not be
violated.26
The Ninth Circuit's Opinion in Manypenny
The 1971 Criminal Appeals Act clarified the right of a federal
prosecutor to appeal, but left unanswered the question whether a state
prosecutor could appeal in a removed criminal case. In Arizona v.
Manypenny, the Ninth Circuit held that a state prosecutor could not
appeal in a removed criminal case.27 In Manypenny, a federal border
patrol officer for the Immigration and Naturalization Service shot an
alien as he ran back towards the border between Mexico and the
United States.28 Arizona prosecuted the officer, Manypenmy, under
uniform, the Supreme Court followed this weight of authority and denied the government a
common-law right to appeal. .d at 318.
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5; 26 Stat. 827, 828.
22. See, e.g., Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178-79 (1955).
23. 144 U.S. at 319-23. In reaching this second conclusion, the Court noted that noth-
ing in the Judiciary Act specifically authorized appeals and commented that the statute
"cannot therefore be presumed to confer upon the government the right." Id at 323. This
rule was adopted to ensure that "so serious and far-reaching an innovation in the criminal
jurisprudence of the United States" would not merely be presumed. Id This holding was
recently affirmed by the Court. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568
(1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
24. Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976)).
25. The act also permitted the government to appeal from a decision sustaining a spe-
cial plea in bar if jeopardy had not attached. Id The act was difficult to apply, see United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1975) (discussing difficulty with statutes application),
and was amended several times. See Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. VIII,
§ 1301, 82 Stat. 237; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 58, 63 Stat. 97.
26. Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14(a), 84 Stat. 1890 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1976)). See note 2 supra. For a general discussion of the Criminal Appeals Act, see
Caruso, Double Jeopardy and GovernmentAppeals in Criminal Cases, 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 295 (1976). The statute further provides that the "provisions of this section should be
literally construed to effectuate its purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). See note 2 supra.
27. 608 F.2d 1197, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 1979).
28, 445 F. Supp. 1123, 1125 (D. Ariz. 1977).
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state law for assault with a deadly weapon. Manypenny removed the
case to federal court. A jury convicted him, but the district court judge
entered a judgment of acquittal, apparently because Manypenny was
protected by federal immunity from prosecutions based on state law.29
Arizona attempted to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit.
The majority opinion denied Arizona the right to appeal, finding
that, because federal law controlled Arizona's right to appeal, the ap-
peal had to be supported by a specific federal statute. As Sanges 'and
subsequent cases held that section 1291 did not provide this specific
authority,30 the court considered section 3731. Invoking the plain
meaning rule, the court found that section 3731 permitted appeals only
"by the United States," and could not be interpreted to encompass a
state acting as prosecutor in a removed criminal proceeding. 3'
In dissent, Judge Kennedy challenged the necessity for express
congressional authorization. Although Sanges held that the United
States could not appeal without express congressional authorization, no
case had ever held that a state in federal court could not appeal without
express congressional authorization. As the requirement of specific leg-
islative authorization serves to restrict the power of a sovereign to pro-
long criminal proceedings against those subject to its sanctions, and as
the sanctions here were imposed by state law, the dissent stated that the
power of a state to appeal should be decided by examining state, as
well as federal, statutes. 32
Based on this reasoning, the dissent rejected the majority's propo-
sition that section 1291 could not be interpreted to provide the neces-
sary authority. While agreeing that section 1291 alone would not
provide specific authorization, the dissent reasoned that a general au-
thorization by Congress, coupled with a specific state authorization,
would provide the necessary authority. The majority had declined to
rely on state statutes authorizing appeals because federal law, rather
than state law, governs in nondiversity removal cases. 33 The dissent
29. Id at 1125-28. The district court concluded that if the officer honestly believed his
actions to be reasonable in carrying out his federal duties he would be immune from state
law prosecution. Id at 1127. Noting that it was unsure whether this question was for the
judge or jury, the court concluded that it made no difference. Id Finding that no reason-
able person could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer's actions were unrea-
sonable, id at 1127-28, the judge granted the defendant's motion for acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict, id at 1128. See also 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1658-59.
30. See note 23 supra.
31. 608 F.2d at 1198-1200. The majority so concluded despite § 3731's specific provi-
sion for liberal construction to effectuate its purposes. See note 2 supra.
32. Id. at 1201-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
33. Id at 1200.
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did not disagree with the proposition that federal law controlled, but
suggested that the Erie34 doctrine, which requires the application of
federal procedural and state substantive law in diversity actions, in-
cluding civil cases removed to federal court because of diversity juris-
diction, may be used analogously in analyzing the rights of the parties
in removed nondiversity cases. 35 The dissent suggested that the court
should consider the Arizona law governing appeals because the right to
appeal resembled rights found to be substantive. 36 Under Arizona law,
a state prosecutor could appeal the ruling at issue in the case. Thus, the
dissent concluded that section 1291 could be interpreted to permit a
state prosecutor to appeal because state legislation specifically had au-
thorized a similar appeal in the state court system.37
The dissent further disagreed with the majority's restrictive inter-
pretation of the specific authorization provided in section 3731. The
legislative history of section 3731 indicates that Congress never consid-
ered the possibility of an appeal by a state prosecutor in federal court.38
The dissent concluded that Congress could not have intended to pro-
vide extensive appellate rights to United States prosecutors without
also providing such rights to similarly situated state prosecutors be-
cause the section permits appeals in every case except those in which
the double jeopardy clause would be violated.39 Thus, the purpose un-
derlying the statute, "to prevent erroneous trial court rulings from
34. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
35. 608 F.2d at 1202 n.l (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Erie could be used only by analogy
because, as the dissent noted, the action was not removed on grounds of diversity under 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1976), and no statutes comparable to the Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1976), or the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), exist for criminal actions
removed under § 1442(a). Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the federal
policies are similar in both diversity and nondiversity removal situations. Id (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). These policies include providing a neutral forum for the resolution of federal
defenses or claims of an out-of-state citizen, and avoiding harassment of federal officials or
out-of-state citizens by state prosecutors, state parties, or state courts. Id (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting). By not paying heed to the Erie analogy, the majority's rule exercised federal juris-
diction "in a sensitive, perhaps new, dimension." Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, the
dissent relied on the substance-procedure distinction of Erie.
36. On the basis of the interests at stake, the dissent concluded that the right to appeal
resembled those rights found to be substantive. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that
finality, repose, and a desire to correct the more serious errors in lower court proceedings are
the principal interests at stake, and that these considerations also support decisions regard-
ing the statute of limitations and resjudicata, both of which have been held to be substantive
in the Erie context). The dissent also considered analogous decisions by state courts that
supported the same result. .d (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 1202-03 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. Id at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority agreed with this conclusion. Id
at 1199 n.4.
39. Id at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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thwarting lawful prosecutions," 40 applies also in those cases in which a
state prosecutor appeals in federal court.
The Supreme Court's Opinion in Manypenny
Agreeing with much of the analysis in Judge Kennedy's dissenting
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.41 Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun first examined the purpose of permitting removal to a fed-
eral court of a prosecution in state court of a federal officer. Removal
is designed to afford the defendant a forum "free from local interests or
prejudice," and to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of fed-
eral defenses such as immunity. 42 The Court observed that neither
purpose requires that the state prosecutor be denied a right of appeal in
the federal court.43
The Court then examined possible sources of affirmative authority
for such appeals. The Court acknowledged the Sanges rule that gov-
ernment appeals in criminal cases must be expressly authorized by a
legislature, 44 but stated that the requirement of specific authorization
must be interpreted in light of the policy underlying this requirement.
The Court characterized the policy as one prohibiting the government
from burdening criminal defendants with appeals and subsequent retri-
als unless a legislature has determined that such appeals are justified.45
Thus, the Court stated that to require a specific authorization is to re-
quire the "relevant sovereign" to authorize the prosecution's appeal.46
The Court concluded that section 1291 permits appeals by a state "if
[the state] is authorized to do so by state law."'47
40. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
41. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1660-69 with 608 F.2d at 1201-02 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
42. 101 S. Ct. at 1664.
43. Id. at 1664.
44. Id at 1665.
45. ld at 1666-67.
46. Id. at 1668. "The decision to limit or extend a State's appellate authority is a mat-
ter of state law within constitutional constraints. . . . Requiring Congress also to address
explicitly the State's authority contributes nothing to the policy concerns that prompt the
requirement of express sovereign action." Id
47. Id See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. Unlike Judge Kennedy's dissent, the
Court avoided the difficult issue of whether, by § 373 1, Congress meant to exempt all state
laws governing a prosecutor's right of appeal in federal court. Compare id at 1665 n. 18 with
608 F.2d at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
The Court also did not decide whether a state prosecutor could rely on § 3731 to au-
thorize an appeal that state law does not authorize. Id at 1668 n.26 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). Justice Stevens distinguished between a court's power to accept an appeal and an
executive's power to prosecute an appeal. Id at 1669 (Stevens, J., concurring). First, he
argued that the federal judiciary's power to accept an appeal is governed by federal law and
§ 1291 authorizes the federal courts to accept an appeal by state prosecutors. Id Second, he
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In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall charged that the major-
ity's interpretation "flout[ed] Congress' authority to regulate the juris-
diction of the lower federal courts."' 48 The dissent interpreted United
States v. Sanges to require express authorization "from the legislative
body controlling federal court jurisdiction" and concluded that "Con-
gress is the only entity constitutionally empowered to grant express au-
thority for government appeals in the federal courts."49 Thus, the
state's right to appeal in the federal court system must be founded on
some specific congressional enactment. Arizona state law, coupled with
a general authorization under section 1291, did not suffice.50 As did the
majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit, the dissent concluded that sec-
tion 3731 "obviously cannot be read to give [express authorization] to
state prosecutors in removal cases."' 5 ' Furthermore, no other federal
statute was applicable.52 Having rejected the majority's interpretation
of the rule of express authorization under Sanges and subsequent cases,
the dissent concluded that Arizona had no right to appeal. Only Con-
gress, not the courts or the state legislatures, could remedy' the problem
caused by the "anomalous circumstances. '53
The Need for a Theory of Statutory Interpretation
The majority and dissenting opinions in both the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court in Manypenny suggest different approaches to
statutory interpretation. The Ninth Circuit majority opinion applied a
mechanical, plain meaning approach to the relevant statutes. 54 Con-
cluding that the plain meaning rule required a formalistic approach,55
the court found that the state had no right to appeal. The dissent
stressed the policies underlying the statutes and interpreted them more
argued that whether the executive branch may prosecute the appeal is governed by the law
of the sovereign that the prosecutor represents. Id Thus, if state law permitted the prosecu-
tor to pursue the appeal, the prosecutor should be allowed to do so in federal court as well as
in state court. Id As Justice Stevens stated, this analysis lends no support to finding juris-
diction under § 3731 because § 3731 is a federal statute and under his analysis the relevant
law granting authority for state prosecutors to appeal is state law. Id
48. Id at 1669 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49. Id at 1670 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Compare id at 1670 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) with 608 F.2d at 1198-1200. See
text accompanying note 31 supra.
52. Id at 1670 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id at 1671-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. "[W]here the language [of a statute] is clear and unequivocal it is determinative of
it [sic] construction." 608 F.2d at 1199.
55. Id at 1200.
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flexibly.5 6
The Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions reveal simi-
lar approaches. The majority opinion interpreted section 1291 in light
of the purposes and policies underlying the rule of express authoriza-
tion, suggesting that the Court should interpret the relevant statutes
flexibly to reach a sensible result.5 7 In contrast, the dissent concluded
on the basis of Sanges that Congress must authorize an appeal by any
party in federal court.58 As did the majority opinion in the lower court,
the dissent recognized the anomaly produced by its analysis, 59 but
found no reason to depart from the plain meaning of the federal stat-
ute. The dissent summarily concluded that Congress should remedy
any perceived deficiency in the federal statutes.60
None of these opinions, however, advances any reasons for ignor-
ing or seeking guidance from the purpose or policy of the relevant stat-
utes, or for construing the statutory language broadly or narrowly. 61
Without a theory of statutory interpretation to follow in such situa-
tions, choosing among the approaches of the two majority and two dis-
senting opinions is an arbitrary exercise.62 With a theory of statutory
56. "[Section 3731] contains a provision that it shall be liberally construed. The statu-
tory scheme is designed to prevent erroneous trial court rulings from thwarting lawful prose-
cutions. That policy applies with equal force to appeals in those cases in which the state is
the prosecuting entity under the removal statute." Id at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. See notes 41-47 & accompanying text supra.
58. "Sanges plainly requires express authorizationfrom the legislative body controlling
federal court jurisdiction." 101 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis in original).
59. "This case presents an anomalous circumstance [but] it is for Congress, not the
courts, to make changes in Federal jurisdictional statutes." Id at 1672.
60. Id.
61. Justice Blackmun relied on the purposes of the removal statute and the rule of
specific authorization, and Justice Brennan felt constrained by a plain meaning approach.
Yet, neither Justice justified his choice. Furthermore, Justice Brennan has often recognized
the power of courts to interpret statutory language in light of its purposes and policies, and a
court's duty through statutory interpretation to redress congressional oversights or drafting
errors. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328-40 (1978). Yet he refused to adopt such an ap-
proach here.
The same observation holds true for the authors of the Ninth Circuit majority and
dissenting opinions. For example, in Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491
(9th Cir. 1978), Judge Choy, the author of the majority opinion in Manypenny and an advo-
cate of the plain meaning rule, stated: "[I]n light of a recent Supreme Court case, the viabil-
ity of [the plain meaning] rule is questionable . . . [and we] find that under the more
flexible Supreme Court approach the present circumstances require exploration of extrinsic
evidence. ... Id at 494. In United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980), Judge
Choy again elaborated "persuasive policy reasons" for his result, while Judge Kennedy, the
dissenter in Manypenny who favored interpretation in light of statutory policies, concurred
on the grounds of "a simple and literal reading of the statute." Id at 899.
62. That judges often characterize a statute as either "plain" or "ambiguous" without
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interpretation, on the other hand, it may be possible to harmonize both
the plain meaning approach with the purposive approach, and the
court's interpretive role with its deference to the legislature. Thus, this
Article next explores the goals of statutory interpretation and attempts
to develop a theory of the plain meaning rule that can serve as such an
analytical tool.
A Structured Approach to Statutory Interpretation: Untangling
the Plain Meaning Rule
Commentators often have noted that every rule or canon of con-
struction has its opposite;63 thus, invocation of a rule or canon of con-
struction depends not on any principle, but on whether the canon
rationalizes a result reached on other grounds.64 The judiciary's use of
the plain meaning rule is no exception to this truism of statutory con-
struction. 65 The decision to invoke the plain meaning of a statute or to
examine its legislative history and purposes is in most cases unprinci-
pled,66 as illustrated by the Manypenny opinions.67
Several considerations of statutory interpretation should influence
the development of a theory of interpretation that will make the plain
meaning rule an aid in resolving cases in a reasoned manner, rather
than a convenient tool by which to justify a preconceived result.68
persuasive reasoning to justify a result reached on some other grounds has been noted by
many commentators over the years. See, e.g., Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic
Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 11-18 (1939); Kernochan,
Statutory Interpretation An Outline ofMethod, 3 DAL. L.J. 333, 344 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Kemochan].
63. See, eg., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS
app. C (1960).
64. Id; see also Jones, he Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 11-18 (1939); Kemochan, supra note 62, at 344.
65. For various formulations of the plain meaning rule, see notes 99-107, 127-131 &
accompanying text infra.
66. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory In-
terpretation in the "Modern"Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299, 1302-08 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Murphy].
67. See note 61 & accompanying text supra.
68. The following discussion of statutory interpretation and the plain meaning rule is
influenced primarily, although not exclusively, by five sources: Professors John Kernochan
and Arthur Murphy of Columbia University, Professor Reed Dickerson of Indiana Univer-
sity, and Emeritus Professor Harry Jones of Columbia University and Emeritus Professor J.
Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin. It is in an attempt to respond to the statutory
interpretation critiques of each of these professors that this discussion had its genesis.
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Statutes in the Political Process
Implicit in any question of statutory construction is the determina-
tion of how best to divide decisionmaking responsibilities among the
branches of government.69 In considering an issue of statutory con-
struction, a judge must balance the interactions in the political process
of legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial authorities. A
statute is "the product of a political process which will be implemented
within a political process"; 70 it must be considered in the context in
which it was enacted and in light of the practical effects of its construc-
tion. Absent an awareness of these concepts, judicial interpretation
may neither reflect legislative intent7' nor come to a sensible result.72
Within the framework established by the Constitution, decision-
making responsibility should be allocated to the branch or combination
of branches of government that can balance most appropriately the
competing interests involved. Typically, this responsibility will be allo-
cated to the legislature, as it is central to the resolution of value con-
flicts in our society. 73 The legislature, however, is not the most
appropriate branch of government to resolve every dispute. Judicial
expertise, the need for continuing adjustments, or the relative insula-
tion of the judiciary from certain kinds of political pressures may make
the courts more competent than the legislature to resolve a particular
problem.74 Determining which branch of government is best able to
69. "How well the courts discharge [the task of statutory interpretation] has a great
effect on the nature of the task of legislative drafting, on the burdens and business of the
legislature, and on the effectiveness of legislative law and of the legal system as a whole."
Kernochan, supra note 62, at 336.
70. Professor J. Willard Hurst, James S. Carpentier lectures, "The Jurisprudence of
Legislation," Columbia Law School (Oct. 15-17, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Hurst, Lecture].
71. See generally Kernochan, supra note 62, at 349-55, 360-63 (discussing need for judi-
cial sensitivity in search for legislative intent).
72. Id at 338-45, 355-60, 363-65 (discussing the need for judicial sensitivity in constru-
ing the statute's words, policies, and presumptions to reach a sensible result).
73. As noted by Professor J. Willard Hurst, the legislature is central to the resolution of
value conflicts because of its broad powers to define rules and standards of conduct, to tax,
spend, and borrow, to create or legitimate new forms of association, and to investigate any
matters affecting community affairs, and because of its root in an electoral base, with two
houses to balance interests differently. Thus, the legislature is the originator of public policy
in our system. Hurst, Lecture, supra note 70. See also Kernochan, supra note 62, at 345:
"The first premise is the supremacy of the legislature. This premise provides our fundamen-
tal interpretive guideline."
74. See examples in notes 78-84 infra. Similarly, certain problems are best resolved
administratively because of the technical knowledge or great amount of information neces-
sary to resolve them. Professor Hurst noted three reasons for administrative treatment:
(1) technical professional knowledge can be put to use in formulating public policy, as with
health standards; (2) detailed experience can give rise to specialized knowledge in the ina-
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balance the competing interests generally involves at least two factors:
the expertise and the biases of the relevant branch of government.
Expertise and Institutional Structure
Legislatures often delegate the power to develop legal standards to
other branches of government in order to make use of the expertise and
institutional structure of those institutions. Thus, the legislature may
delegate a variety of powers, including rulemaking, to an administra-
tive agency.75
Other statutes are sensibly interpreted as delegating power to the
courts to develop legal standards in light of the courts' accumulated
knowledge generated by varied fact patterns.76 Despite the separation
of powers doctrine,77 such delegations are common. Examples include
the Sherman Act,78 the Anti-Injunction Act,79 section 301 of the Labor-
plementation process, as with SEC regulations; and (3) an immense mass and bulk of data
can require nonlegislative treatment, as with Social Security laws. Hurst, Lecture, supra
note 70. Furthermore, pressure by different interest groups may make a legislative solution
difficult to enact with sufficient particularity.
75. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557 (1976). See generally Stewart, The Reform of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1695-96 (1975).
Serious legislative review of the powers delegated to an agency is in many circum-
stances difficult or impossible because of time constraints, legislative inertia after a problem
is delegated, delay, and lobbying groups on both sides. Hurst, Lecture, supra note 70. Re-
view of agency action in budget committee meetings, however, can provide some measure of
control. Id
76. See generally Kernochan, supra note 62, at 345-46.
77. For an excellent discussion of the breadth of Congress' ability to delegate power
and the concomitant problems associated with this breadth, see McGowan, Congress, Court,
and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977). For a more colorful dis-
cussion of the same points, see Schwartz, OfAdinistrators and Philosopher-Kings, the Re-
public, the Laws, and Delegations ofPower, 72 Nw. L. REv. 443 (1978). See also Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307 (1976).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). The broad language of the Sherman Act and its subse-
quent interpretation clearly support the argument that the courts, and not Congress, exercise
decisionmaking responsibility in this area. See generally Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Dqning the Scope ofExemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refning the Rule
ofReason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265 (1979) (discussing the Supreme Court's recent balancing
efforts in antitrust law in light of the fact that "antitrust law [has] developed largely as a
judicial tradition"); see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061,
2068 (May 26, 1981) (quoting National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435
'U.S. 679, 688 (1978): "'The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that [the legislature]
expected the court to give shape to the [Sherman Act's] broad mandate by drawing on com-
mon-law tradition."'
This fact does not mean, however, that every decision under the Sherman Act will be
decided by a court. In Texas Industries, for example, the Court declined to find a right of
contribution under the antitrust laws despite this broad mandate because "[t]here is nothing
in the statute itself, in its legislative history, or in the overall regulatory scheme to suggest
that Congress intended the courts to have the power to alter or supplement the remedies
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Management Relations Act, 80 section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,8 '
federal and state immunities from the antitrust laws,82 the doctrines of
enacted." 101 S. Ct. at 2069. One may disagree with some of the Court's reasoning to reach
this result. For example, "the continuing existence of th[e] statutory scheme for 90 years
without amendments authorizing contribution" id. could be understood to support the posi-
tion that Congress has by implication left to the Court the development of the law with
respect to contribution, instead of the Court's conclusion that Congress reserved this deci-
sion for itself, id at 2069-70. The failure to consider the fact that political pressures on
Congress may make informed congressional resolution of the problem difficult if not impos-
sible to achieve may be a weakness in the Court's opinion. Congress theoretically is better
able to balance the competing policies, but, because of political constraints, may not be able
to do so in practice. Nevertheless, the Court's awareness that its limited competence and
expertise in some circumstances counsels against broad decisionmaking responsibility is
commendable. See id at 2070. Cf. Richards, Taking "Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously"
Reflections on Dworkin and the American Revival of National Law, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1265,
1311-13 (1977).
It thus may be that the Court did not incorrectly decide the issue before it in Texas
Industries. The scope of liability under the Sherman Act has been left to the courts to de-
velop. With respect to permissible remedies, however, it may be that those provisions of the
Sherman Act do not delegate to the courts a power to develop remedial schemes. Compre-
hensive statutes with numerous sections, such as the securities laws or the antitrust laws,
need not be interpreted in a monolithic fashion. Different sections of an act may reflect
different legislative intentions.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). Section 2283 provides: "A court of the United States may
not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by
Act of Congress or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments." The history of the Act, and in particular the 1948 amendment, indicates an
intent by Congress to delegate to courts the responsibility for decisionmaking under the Act.
See Note, Antitrust-Anti-Injunction Statute-Clayton Act Section 16, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
1208, 1215-16.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). This section creates a substantive right of management or
labor to sue to enforce collective bargaining agreements. As noted in dictum in Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. W.L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 802 (1956): "[T]o the extent that Congress itself has not prescribed the rules to be
applied in a § 301 case, it intended to leave to the federal courts, and ultimately to the
Supreme Court of the United States, to formulate and declare the rules as a matter of federal
decisional law." See also Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061, 2068
(1981); "[T]his Court has read § 301(a). . .as vesting in the courts the power to develop a
common law of labor-management relations."
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of
[law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ...person within the jurisdiction [of the
United States] to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or] suit in equity .... " On the
court's role in interpreting § 1983, see Green v. Dumke, 480 F.2d 624, 628 n.7 (9th Cir.
1973): "The contours of § 1983 must necessarily remain flexible to accommodate changing
circumstances and the exigencies of a given era." See also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379 (1976): "[A]ppropriate consideration must be given [by the court] to principles of feder-
alism in determining the availability and scope of [§ 1983]."
82. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (discus-
sion of antitrust exemption doctrine); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments.- De-
fining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265, 267 (1979) ("[In balancing antitrust policies,] the Court carries special
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ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, 83 and the absence of specific statu-
tory authority in areas such as standing.84 In these areas, decisionmak-
ing responsibility has been transferred in practice from the legislatures
to the courts. In each of these areas, judicial expertise or the need for
continual adjustments might make the courts more competent than the
legislature to resolve issues. Furthermore, pressure by different interest
groups might make a legislative solution of particular problems diffi-
cult to achieve. For example, the judiciary might be thought to possess
special expertise concerning issues of standing, ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction, and the circumstances in which injunctions should be
granted. Continual adjustments might prove too burdensome and
time-consuming for the legislature in areas such as the Sherman Act or
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. Pressure by dif-
ferent interest groups might make legislative resolution of particular
types of problems under these last two statutes, as well as statutes such
as section 1983, difficult to achieve.
In enacting these statutes, the legislature seems to be directing the
courts to develop the legislature's original language through flexible in-
terpretation. Perhaps because of perceived constitutional problems
with the exercise of legislative power by the judicial branch,85 the
courts usually do not discuss this aspect of statutory interpretation. 86
responsibility. . . because antitrust law developed largely as a judicial tradition ....");
Note, Antitrust Law--Municpal Immunity-Application of the State Action Doctrine to Mu-
nicipalities, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 570, 575 n.34, 577-78 (concluding that "the real basis for the
finding of a state action exemption [in the antitrust laws] lay not in the scant legislative
intent... but instead in the policies inherent in such a finding").
83. Cases involving pendent party jurisdiction are, strictly speaking, a matter of statu-
tory law. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976). The statute on which the initial federal
jurisdiction is grounded must indicate that Congress did not expressly or impliedly negate
the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction over the nonfederal claim. Id In determining
whether Congress has negated the exercise ofjurisdiction, however, a number of factors are
examined, not all of them directly involving a search for legislative intent. The most promi-
nent factors under the statutory test seem to be: whether the proposed claim's relation to the
original claim is one of logical dependence, Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir.
1979); whether all the claims could be tried in one action in state court, id; whether the
nonfederal claim is against a party who would not otherwise be in the action, Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 367 (1978); and whether the general construction of
the relevant statute evinces a broad or narrow interpretation, id These factors concern a
court-conducted balance of the costs and benefits of asserting ancillary or pendent jurisdic-
tion more than they involve a hypothetical legislative intent.
84. See Tushnet, The Sociology of Article 1II: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93
HARV. L. REv. 1698, 1705 (1980). For discussion of rare legislative action in this field, see
Fretz, S. 3005: Revisions of the Law of Standing in Federal Court, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
95 (1978) (discussing proposed bill S. 3005).
85. See note 77 & accompanying text supra.
86. It is no less important, however, despite this judicial silence. Arguably, as our sys-
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Legislative action that is designed to have courts assume responsi-
bility for developing standards may be denominated as a "utilization"
because when it exists the legislature, to assure just and efficient deci-
sionmaking, "utilizes" the institutional framework and expertise of the
courts. If the legislature and the courts recognized that delegation by
the legislature to the judicial branch sometimes helps a statutory
scheme to function, they could keep each other informed concerning
when each branch considers that the legislature has utilized judicial
expertise and the framework of the judiciary. 87
Bias
The second question raised in allocating the decisionmaking re-
sponsibility involves the biases of the relevant decisionmaking authori-
ties. This concern is reflected at the constitutional level by modem
equal protection doctrine, which identifies certain classes needing spe-
cial judicial protection against the possible bias of government authori-
ties.88 Legislation affecting such groups is subject to a heightened level
of judicial scrutiny to ensure that their interests are adequately
protected.89
The desire to protect the interests of the less powerful also has
been reflected in maxims of interpretation. An established rule of con-
tract interpretation, for example, states that insurance contracts should
be strictly construed against the insurance company and in favor of the
tern becomes more legislative in character and as statutes displace the common law, the
judicial responsibility to interpret statutes in the way suggested here will be as important, if
not more important, than the court's recognized lawmaking function in common law adjudi-
cation. See generally Kernochan, supra note 62, at 333-37, 345-46.
87. Under the present system, only indirect communication, such as when the courts
require a clear statement of legislative intent or the legislature overturns a particular court
decision, exists. For an example of how the present indirect cooperative federalism between
the Supreme Court and Congress works in a particular context, see Bloch, Cooperative Fed-
eralism and the Role of Litigation in the Development of FederalAFDC Eligibility Policy, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 1 (1979).
For a discussion of utilization and nonutilization statutes with reference to the plain
meaning rule, see notes 132-44 & accompanying text infra.
In some complex statutes, it may be that part of the statute represents a utilization,
while with respect to other parts of the statute the legislature has reserved decisionmaking
authority for itself. See, e.g., Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2061,
2068-69. See note 78 supra.
88. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Ely, The
Supreme Court, 1977 Term, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 5, 5-16 (1978); Ely, Toward a Representative-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review, 37
MD. L. REv. 451, 454-56 (1978).
89. See, e.g., Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections. An Equal Protection Anal-
ysis, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1491, 1492-93 (1980).
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insured.90 Similarly, between large businesses and individual consum-
ers, contracts are sometimes construed against the drafter on the theory
that the drafter controlled the terms of the contract.91
A bias against the interests of the less powerful may also be pres-
ent in problems of statutory drafting. The interests of politically pow-
erless individuals or groups92 are less likely to be vigorously
represented in the process of drafting a statute. While powerful groups
and individuals, because of their talents and resources, can lobby effec-
tively for statutory language to protect, define, or delimit the rights that
the legislature intends to grant, statutes affecting groups with less polit-
ical power are not likely to receive the same care in drafting.93
A judge attempting to implement the legislature's intent must take
90. See AM. JUR. 2d, Insurance §§ 271-77 (1964 & Supp. 1980).
91. See AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 276 (1964 & Supp. 1980). Another example of this
desire is the presumption in Indian treaty interpretation that ambiguities should be resolved
in favor of the Indians, in part because of their inferior bargaining position against the
federal government. See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 502-03 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. In this Article, politically powerless groups include those which have difficulty en-
suring that bills primarily involving or affecting their interests will receive careful considera-
tion by the legislature. In particular, politically powerless groups will have difficulty
ensuring careful consideration by the legislative committee before which much of the spe-
cific language of the bill is developed.
Under this definition, the bill must primarily involve or affect a politically powerless
group. A tangential involvement or effect will not trigger a concern with drafting bias.
Three reasons support this conclusion. First, a bill that only tangentially involves or affects
politically powerless groups, and thus primarily involves or affects politically powerful
groups, can be expected to be drafted with greater care. Second, as the effect on the politi-
cally powerless groups is merely tangential, they should be able to ensure that the legislature
at least gives the minimal attention necessary to consider the impact of the tangential effect.
Third, the justification for the distinction between powerful and powerless groups is not that
politically powerless groups deserve special substantive protection from the operation of
legislative enactments such as the equal protection clause provides for suspect classes, but
that the different abilities politically powerful and powerless groups have to ensure careful
drafting require the judiciary to be especially sensitive in order for statutes affecting their
interests to be interpreted according to the legislature's intent. See notes 94-95 & accompa-
nying text infra. The same considerations are inapposite when the statute only tangentially
involves or affects a politically powerless group.
93. This lack of legislative attention can result in a lack of care in drafting that can
arise in two circumstances. First, a bill that primarily involves politically powerless groups
may be drafted with relatively little care because no significant lobbying pressure will force
more careful consideration. Second, while a bill that primarily affects groups with little
political power may be drafted with somewhat more care if the bill incidentally involves
politically powerful groups, it is likely that those parts of the bill that affect politically pow-
erless groups will be given less consideration. The legislature may not take the same amount
of time to ensure careful drafting of these provisions of such a bill, and the politically power-
ful groups involved with the bill are not likely to be concerned with ensuring the careful
drafting that protects the rights of the politically powerless in such sections. In fact, the
results of lobbying by politically powerful groups in such situations may be that the nuances
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particular care when interpreting a statute that deals with politically
powerless groups. First, errors in drafting are more likely to occur be-
cause bills affecting politically powerless groups usually receive more
perfunctory treatment than do bills affecting more powerful interests.94
The legislature may not consider every word of such a bill as carefully
as it otherwise would. Second, even in the absence of drafting errors,
the politically powerless are less able to lobby effectively against the
inclusion of words whose nuances are unfavorable to their interests.
The legislature may not ensure that an unintended negative effect on
politically powerless groups is avoided or that the literal meaning of
words will not have an unfavorable impact in later unforeseen situa-
tions. Unless the legislature carefully addresses a particular problem,
as it may not when dealing with the politically powerless, giving literal
effect to such a bill's words may frustrate a legislative intent that, with
careful drafting, would be reflected in the statute.95
Obvious difficulties arise in determining which groups have rela-
tively more or less political power. The same group may have great
power with regard to one kind of statute, but possess relatively less
political power with regard to another statute.96 Moreover, the power
of a group may change over time. In most cases, the relative power of
an individual or group should be determined by referring to the time at
which the statute was drafted, although a subsequent change in power
sometimes may justify a change in analysis.97 A group or individual's
political power should be determined in light of the purpose underlying
of enacted words will be more unfavorable to the politically powerless than they otherwise
would be.
94. For a general discussion of the difficulties of drafting, see R. DICKERSON, THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING (1965); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 97-98, 171-74, 223-25, 277-78 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
DICKERSON].
95. Cf. Kernochan, supra note 62, at 345-46: "[Nlotions [of verbal literalness] are
wholly inadequate in light of. . .the difficulties of drafting and applying general law, with
imperfect words and imperfect foresight."
96. The most obvious example of this would be a special interest lobby that has great
political power on bills in its special area of interest, but has relatively less power on other
types of bills.
97. This change could occur in two ways. A powerful group at the time the statute was
enacted may subsequently lose power. As the group was powerful when the words were
drafted, such a group should be counted as powerful in the absence of amendments that
materially alter the statute's meaning because it was powerful when the words were drafted
and could ensure reasonably careful drafting. A group that was powerless when the statute
was enacted, but that later became powerful, presents more of a problem. Although power-
less when the words of the statute were initially passed, such a group arguably could have
the statute amended because of their present power if the enacted words were imprecise.
However, the difficulty with amending a statute, once passed, suggests that only in rare cases
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the distinction between politically powerful and powerless groups.
This distinction focuses on the extent to which it is likely that the legis-
lature was forced to consider the effect of the statutory language on the
interests of the group or individual. In this light, the distinction be-
tween politically powerful and powerless groups can be applied by
judges facing problems of statutory interpretation. 98
Use of the Plain Meaning Rule to Provide a Structure for
Discovering Legislative Intent
The Plain Meaning Rule Defined
The canon of plain meaning is the starting point for most
problems of statutory interpretation. Under the plain meaning rule,
"[i]f the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity,
nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that mean-
ing, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be accepted. . .."99
In the past, the plain meaning rule rested on theories of language
and meaning, now discredited, which held that words have inherent or
fixed meanings. 100 These theories are unnecessary to the plain meaning
rule, however, if the rule is interpreted to direct a court to construe and
apply words according to the meaning that they are ordinarily given,
taking into account the statutory context, basic rules of grammar, and
any special usages stated by the legislature on the face of the statute. 101
So defined, the plain meaning rule requires courts to consider legisla-
should later political power rebut the presumption of less careful drafting created by original
political powerlessness.
98. For a discussion of this bias against politically powerless groups in the drafting of
statutes in terms of the plain meaning rule, see notes 145-47 & accompanying text infra. The
difficulties with defining politically powerful and powerless groups in other contexts is dis-
cussed in Stewart, The Reform ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667,
1787-88 (1975). See also Ely, The Consitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 723, 729-36 (1974).
99. DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 229 (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670
(1889)). Cf. Murphy, supra note 66, at 1299 (citing United States v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 278
U.S. 269, 278 (1929): "[Where the language of an enactment is clear and construction ac-
cording to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words em-
ployed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.").)
100. See, eg., Kernochan, supra note 62, at 341: "[The plain meaning rule] assumes that
words have a single necessary meaning independent of their full context, without regard to
how those words were used." This theory of language is now uniformly discredited. See
Kernochan, supra note 62, at 341 nn.31 & 32; DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 105-16 (echoing
the uniform post-Wittgenstein view that words "mean" nothing by themselves apart from
context).
101. DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 230-36. Professor Dickerson notes that any version
of the plain meaning rule should include significant elements of proper context. Id at 232.
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tive purposes or policies appearing on the face of the statute as part of
the statute's context. 102 In addition, background facts of which judicial
notice can be taken are properly considered as part of the statute's con-
text because presumably the legislature also was familiar with them
when it passed the statute. 0 3 Reference to a statute's context to deter-
mine its plain meaning also includes examining closely related statutes,
because legislators enact legislation in light of existing statutes.' °4
The plain meaning rule thus does not preclude an interpretation of
statutory language based on the statute's purpose. The plain meaning
rule should not constrain a court from taking stated purposes on the
face of a statute into account in determining the meaning of particular
language.10 5 Rather, modem debate over the rule centers on the per-
missible use of extrinsic materials to determine legislative intent. 0 6 It
is thus important to answer the question of when the rule should "pre-
102. Id. at 97-98, 113. Professor Dickerson cautions, however, against too great reliance
on such statements of purpose, noting that "most formal statements of purpose in bills...
tend to be innocuous generalities designed to offend the least number of people, a fact that
destroys most of their usefulness for resolving specific uncertainties of meaning." Id at 91.
Yet, Professor Dickerson admits that "[a] general legislative purpose clause may ...be
helpful where a very general statute in effect delegates lawmaking power to the courts,"
under our terminology a utilization statute, and that "specific purpose statements ... re-
spectfully prefixed . . . to particular commands, authorizations, or prohibitions" are effec-
tive. Id at 98.
103. This element of plain meaning interpretation reflects the rule of Heydon's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch. Ch. 1584). It is sometimes referred to as seeking out the mischief to be
remedied in the background facts. That this is an appropriate consideration under a plain
meaning approach is evidenced by the fact that English courts traditionally have refused to
rely on legislative history, yet have applied the rule in Heydon's Case. See H. JONES, J.
KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD: CASES AND TEXT MATERIALS 367-68 (1980).
See generaly DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 82.
104. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974): "[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the
duty of the courts . . . to regard each as effective."); DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 105.
It is unclear whether the majority opinion for the Ninth Circuit in Manypenny shared
the view that the above elements of a statute's context are appropriate to examine in deter-
mining the plain meaning of a statute. The majority seemed to use the plain meaning rule as
a limit even on the use of policies that could be derived from the statute's context, and not as
a bar to examining legislative history. See 608 F.2d at 1198-1200. Indeed, the court ex-
amined legislative history to confirm the apparent plain meaning of the statute while at the
same time rejecting an interpretation of the statute that would have been consistent with the
statute's policies. Id at 1199-1200. If this is so, then the majority was relying upon a version
of the plain meaning rule that is outdated. See notes 105-07 & accompanying text infra.
105. E.g., Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902), rev'd, 196 U.S. 1
(1904). This Article also rejects the position that the plain meaning rule counsels a court not
to consider such intrinsic material as the statute's title or preamble. E.g., In re Camden
Shipbuilding Co., 227 F. Supp. 751 (D. Me. 1964). See generally DICKERSON, supra note 94,
at 230-31 (also rejecting these positions); accord, Murphy, supra note 65, at 1299-1300.
106. See Murphy, supra note 66, at 1299-1300.
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elude resort to bits of legislative history such as reports, hearings, and
debates." 10 7
Exceptions to the Plain Meaning Rule
Thus defined, there are at least two situations in which the plain
meaning rule should have no application, and resort to legislative his-
tory and the purposes underlying the statute is therefore appropriate.
First, the rule cannot apply unless the words of the statute are specific
enough to'be said to have a plain meaning.108 For example, a require-
ment that an action be taken "in the public interest" or that it be "rea-
sonable" has no plain meaning. 0 9 Many words of broad scope do have
a plain meaning, but statutes that employ vague or ambiguous words
do not.'10
Second, the plain meaning rule should have no application when
the legislature never contemplated the problem before the court.
Words specifically chosen by the legislature to resolve disputes in one
situation cannot apply in their plain meaning to an unforeseen situa-
tion."' In many cases, the nature of the statutory language and the
107. Id In some instances under the plain meaning rule, resort to legislative history
may be appropriate. See notes 132-44 & accompanying text infra.
108. This exception is recognized by all formulations of the plain meaning rule, which
provide that the plain meaning rule has application only "when the language is clear" or
"the words are free from doubt." See generally DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 231; Murphy,
supra note 66, at 1299-1300. On the difficulties of deciding whether a statute has a plain
meaning, see Nutting, The .4mbiguiOy of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L. REV. 509
(1940).
109. Words such as "substantial" and "material" are "weasel words" which have "such
indefinite meaning that [they] afford a court... flexibility to [decide the case] in the interest
of fairness." Miller, The Game Plan" Drafting the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L. Rnv.
550, 550 (1977).
110. The difference suggested here is between general words and vague or ambiguous
words. Professor Dickerson notes: "The most important difference between ambiguous or
vague language and general language is that ambiguity and vagueness constitute uncertain-
ties of meaning, whereas mere generality does not." DICKERSON, Supra note 94, at 52. Pro-
fessor Dickerson also draws a distinction between ambiguous words, use of which is always
undesirable in a statute, and vague words, which in some cases can be useful if the legisla-
ture wants to grant leeway to administrative agencies or courts. Id at 48-51. Vague or
ambiguous words prevent a statute from having a plain meaning, however, because they
introduce uncertainty into the statute's meaning. Id at 49.
111. The danger with interpreting a statute according to the plain meaning rule in an
unforeseen situation is shown by the following example. Assume that an 1870 statute pro-
hibits any person from obtaining a lien on a doctor's carriage. In 1920, the question arises
whether or not a lien can be obtained on a doctor's car. The plain meaning of the statute
would suggest that it could, because a car is not a carriage. A more reasonable construction
of the statute, which probably would be evident from the statute's legislative history, would
be that preventing liens from being obtained on a doctor's vehicle was the subject of the
legislature's attention, and that the statute's purpose was to ensure that doctors, despite
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alleged unforeseen situation will demonstrate that the legislature did
not or could not have anticipated the issue presently before the court.
Thus, for example, the plain meaning rule should not control the appli-
cability to television broadcasting of statutes enacted to regulate
radio. ' 12
When it is unclear whether the legislature considered a specific
problem, however, it may be necessary to examine legislative history to
determine whether the problem was considered. If, from legislative
history, it appears that the legislature did not consider the problem
before the court, then the plain meaning rule would not apply. Thus,
legislative history could be used as background evidence of the general
concerns to which the statute was directed. Furthermore, if examining
the legislative history for this limited purpose reveals a definitive an-
swer to the problem, the statute should be interpreted according to this
answer, whether or not the interpretation is in accordance with the
"plain meaning" of the statute." 13
The majority of cases, however, fall into a third category. When
the legislature considers a class of problems, but does not specifically
address the problem before the court, the court should restrict its in-
quiry to the plain meaning of the words enacted by the legislature, in
debts, could always reach patients. The word "carriage" would have been adopted in 1870
because then doctors used that vehicle, and because it was not then foreseen that cars would
exist. The plain meaning of "carriage" should not be used to frustrate legislative intent, as it
would if "carriage" instead of "vehicle" were interpreted as its meaning. The general princi-
ple is that it would be inefficient and, as a practical matter, impossible to require the legisla-
ture to amend every statute "to cover endlessly diverse and changing facts" every time new
techniques or situations arise that call for a change in the literal meaning of the enacted
words. See Kernochan, supra note 62, at 345-46.
112. See Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 929 (1951).
113. This analysis follows logically from the conclusion that it is appropriate for a court
to consult legislative history to determine if the legislature considered the problem. It would
be foolish to suggest that a judge should follow the "plain meaning" of a statute when he or
she knows definitively that the legislature considered the particular problem and intended a
different result. The plain meaning rule is a tool of construction that, when properly ap-
plied, helps to determine legislative intent rather than to frustrate it. A definitive answer in
the legislative history arises from evidence that is "relevant and persuasive." See Jones, The
Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH.
U.L.Q. 2, 26 (1939). It is not the intention of this Article to discuss the problem in depth, but
there is a theoretical problem with attributing to an entire legislature the opinions expressed
in committee reports, or by individual legislators in various contexts. Despite these difficul-
ties, judges and commentators who examine legislative history seem able to distinguish leg-
islative history that demonstrates a clear intent from that which does not. See generally
DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 67-86 (discussing the Max Radin-Jerome Landis debate on the
coherence of the concept of legislative intent).
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the light of the other contextual sources for determining intent." 4 The
legislative history in this situation will reveal that the legislature gener-
ally considered issues that bear some resemblance'to those involved in
the lawsuit before the court, but did not express its intent on the precise
problem facing the court. As the dangers of using legislative history in
such a case are high and the benefits of permitting such use are rela-
tively low, the plain meaning rule should govern. 1 5 When, however,
114. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra. This discussion distinguishes from all
other cases the case in which the legislative history addresses the problem before the court
and yields only one reasonable interpretation of legislative intent. If the legislative history
yields a definitive answer, interpretation based on the legislative history should be adopted.
See note 113 & accompanying text supra. If, however, as in most cases, the legislative his-
tory is more equivocal, the dangers of permitting its use outweigh the benefits. See note 115
infra. A court in this situation should adhere to the text of the statute, which is the best
evidence of legislative intent. See generally DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 137-68 (discussing
the uses and abuses of legislative history). The balance struck here is very similar to that
struck by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 412 n.29 (1971): "[Ift]he legislative history... is ambiguous... we must look prima-
rily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent."
One may criticize this position because it is impractical to require a judge to disregard
the legislative history with which he or she became familiar in the process of determining
whether the legislature specifically considered the problem before the court. The legislative
history, however, is only being examined to determine whether the legislature specifically
considered the problem, and, when no such evidence is found, the inquiry hypothetically
ends. The limited scope of this inquiry would seem to restrain a judge from engaging in the
more dangerous use of legislative history that sometimes occurs when unlimited resort to
legislative history is permitted. See note 115 infra. In addition, as the judge's opinion in
such a case will have to be based only upon arguments directed to the statutory language
itself, the judge will be forced to rely on the text of the statute to the exclusion of any added
information obtained from the limited legislative history search. Creating such reliance is
one intent of the plain meaning rule. Cf. Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory
Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1, 17 (1965): "[Tihe lazy judge is likely to take the legisla-
tive history as an excuse for foregoing the difficult problems of statutory analysis which it is
his responsibility to meet."
The potential for manipulation exists either in deciding whether the legislative history
specifically addressed the problem or in construing the statute in light of policies in the
legislative history that should not be considered. The potential for manipulation always
exists. It will be easier, however, to identify such manipulation under the theory suggested
here because the nature of the judge's task at each step is explicitly defined; thus, the manip-
ulation would have to occur in answering specific questions, such as whether or not the
legislature specifically considered a problem.
115. The dangers of using legislative history are treated in depth by Professor Dicker-
son. See DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 137-97. Among the problems he notes are (I) that
the importance of the text, the most solemn and deliberative evidence of legislative intent, is
minimized when legislative history is used; (2) the economics of running a legal order sug-
gest that attorneys should be able to rely on what is printed in the statute books; and (3) ex-
tensive use of legislative history favors those who can use their greater resources to construct
more effectively an arguably false picture of legislative intent from careful and selective
documentation of legislative history. Furthermore, as legislative history usually does not
clearly explain a specific meaning, allowing its extensive use increases the opportunity for
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the problem before the court was not foreseen, or the legislative history
yields a definitive answer, the balance is reversed; the court should use
legislative history to determine the proper interpretation." 16
Exceptions to the Exceptions
Two situations limit the propriety of interpreting a statute in light
of its legislative history when the language of the statute is ambiguous
or when the legislature did not consider the problem before the
court. 1 7 First, a legislature or a court may limit the court's lawmaking
power by requiring specific authorization before a statute can apply.' " 8
Such a requirement of specific authorization should prohibit a court
judges to engage in judicial lawmaking by balancing the numerous and often contradictory
policies noted in the legislative history to reach a result that the judge thinks is fair and to
rationalize that result by emphasizing fragmentary pieces of legislative history.
Balanced against these dangers is the fact that the tension between the plain meaning of
the statute and the purpose of the statute that exists when the problem before the court was
unforeseen by the legislature, see note 11 supra, also may exist if the legislature has fore-
seen the situation before the court. Some commentators thus suggest that in every case a
court should be able to use extrinsic materials to aid in its interpretive task. See, e.g., Kerno-
chan, supra note 62, at 341-45. Although there is merit in suggesting that a judge may use
the plain meaning rule "to impose his own reference or that of some hypothetical average
person on statutory words instead of inquiring in the first instance as to the reference of the
enactors [as indicated in legislative history material]," id at 343, the dangers noted above of
permitting unlimited use of legislative history in every case suggest that some limitations on
the use of legislative history are appropriate. Resort to legislative history should be struc-
tured to respond to particular interpretative needs of the court.
116. In permitting the use of legislative history for the purpose of determining whether
the legislature foresaw the particular problem before the court, the authors are aware that
some of the problems associated with the cost of using legislative history, see note 115 supra,
are reintroduced. The benefits of accurate interpretation that result from permitting consid-
eration of whether the legislature specifically considered a problem and from adopting that
interpretation if they did seem to outweigh the added cost associated with a selective search
of the legislative history to see if the problem before the court was addressed specifically.
Moreover, the concern with favoring the party with greater resources, see note 115
supra, is inapposite here. When legislative history is referred to only to determine whether
the legislature specifically considered an issue, the ability to use legislative history selectively
is limited only to the questions of whether the legislative history specifically addressed an
issue, in which case that intent should be adopted, see note 113 supra, and whether the
history only generally addressed the issue, in which case the plain meaning rule should be
adopted, see note 114 supra, or whether the history did not consider the problem at all, in
which case unlimited resort to legislative history to aid the court is permissible, see note I 11
supra. The impact of having greater resources is thus minimized in this situation as much as
is feasible and consistent with a search for legislative intent.
117. When the legislative history reveals a definitive answer to the problem before the
court, that interpretation should be adopted without reference to the limitations discussed
here, because by hypothesis that interpretation accurately represents the legislature's intent.
118. For example, in United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310 (1892), the Supreme Court
held that specific congressional authorization is needed before a federal prosecutor can ap-
peal in a criminal case in federal court. See note 19 supra. This requirement is sometimes
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from relying on legislative history to expand or contract the scope of
the statute's words beyond their plain meaning. A requirement of spe-
cific authorization should limit the power to interpret a statute to apply
to cases not covered by the words of the statute read in context." 9
Thus, if a statute has a plain meaning, the plain meaning rule is
the appropriate limit on a court's power of interpretation, even if the
problem before the court was unforeseen by the legislature. When a
specific authorization is required, the exception to the plain meaning
rule that requires that the rule be abandoned in a case not foreseen by
the legislature in enacting the statute does not apply because the re-
quirement of specific authorization expressly limits a court's freedom to
expand the words of a statute beyond their plain meaning to apply to
unforeseen cases.' 20
A specific authorization requirement also affects the interpretation
of a statute's broad language. Broad language that appears to be plain
phrased as a requirement of express authorization. The phrase "specific authorization" is
used throughout this Article.
119. A requirement of specific authorization is different from the more commonly im-
posed requirement of clear statement. Properly understood, a requirement of clear state-
ment suggests that, when the meaning of a particular provision remains ambiguous after all
appropriate sources of statutory meaning are consulted, a court should not imply the right or
duty that one of the parties seeks. The requirement of clear statement is not concerned
primarily with structuring the use of legislative history materials. Rather, the rule creates a
presumption against certain kinds of government enactments that can be rebutted by a clear
legislative statement. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 542-45 (1980) (legislative
history examined despite use of a clear statement requirement). The clear statement re-
quirement is thus independent of and complementary to the discussion of when legislative
history materials can appropriately be used to seek legislative intent.
In contrast, the requirement of specific authorization is not just a presumption against
certain types of government action. Rather than favoring a particular result when the in-
quiry into legislative intent yields no clear result, a requirement of specific authorization
should be viewed as limiting a court's lawmaking role in seeking legislative intent in the first
instance. To the extent that one views a requirement of specific authorization as merely a
more extreme form of a requirement of clear statement, the difference in degree is for our
purposes a difference in kind in terms of structuring use of legislative history materials. A
requirement of specific authorization, however, always includes a requirement of clear state-
ment because authorization cannot be specific if it is not clear.
120. The previously noted dangers of using the plain meaning rule in unforeseen cases
are applicable here. See note 111 & accompanying text supra. If, through a requirement of
specific authorization, the legislature wants to limit a court's power of interpretation only to
what is specifically enacted, however, the legislature has that right. The safeguards of the
plain meaning rule will still exist. Context, basic rules of grammer, and special usage stated
on the face of the statute can be used to find the plain meaning of the statute. See notes 101-
104 & accompanying text supra. Furthermore, if interpreting the statute plainly yields an
unreasonable or absurd result, the plain meaning of the statute can be abandoned. See notes
145-47 & accompanying text infra.
The specific authorization element is an important analytical factor in the Manypenny
problem. See notes 172-75, 184-86 & accompanying text infra.
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should not be interpreted to satisfy a requirement of specific authoriza-
tion. Broad language may be plain, but it is rarely specific; the rule
requires a specific, not a broad, mandate.' 21 This modification of the
plain meaning rule-narrowly interpreting broad language-can be de-
nominated as the "narrow plain meaning" of the statute, and should be
considered the statute's plain meaning if specific authorization is
required. 22
Under a specific authorization rule, a vague or ambiguous statute
that has no plain meaning should require narrow interpretation in light
of the statute's legislative history. 123 Narrowly interpreting a vague or
ambiguous statute to satisfy a requirement of specific authorization
would pose a unique challenge for a judge: specific authorization must
be constraed from the statute's vague or ambiguous words. This type
of case is either extremely rare or nonexistent. Neither the legislature
nor the courts are likely to adopt a requirement of specific authoriza-
tion in a statute that is so imprecise that it does not have a plain
meaning.
A second limitation on a court's power of interpretation exists
whenever a court construes words to apply to cases outside of their
plain meaning. 124 The words of the statute must have meanings broad
121. For an example, see notes 172-74 & accompanying text infra. In some circum-
stances, situations that fall within the specific meaning of a broad term properly could be
held to provide the needed specific authority under a requirement of specific authorization.
For example, as Professor Dickerson notes, the general word "automobile" would provide
specific authorization for application to a Chevrolet, but not to a three-wheeled vehicle re-
sembling a motorcycle. See DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 51-53 (general words are some-
times specific and yield no uncertainty).
122. If specific authorization is required, and the words to be interpreted are specific
words, the narrow plain meaning of a statute and the ordinary plain meaning of the statute
would be the same. See text accompanying note 187 infra. The fact that a requirement of
specific authorization implies a requirement of clear statement, see note 119 supra, has no
effect on interpretation when use of the statute's narrow plain meaning is appropriate. Be-
cause by hypothesis the words of the statute are plain and specific, they are clear.
123. A court cannot be limited to the "plain meaning" when none exists. As discussed
in note 140 infra, if the statute being interpreted is a utilization statute, both legislative his-
tory materials and the judge's own sense of fairness can guide interpretation. If the statute is
a nonutilization statute, only the statute's legislative history should be used.
This narrow interpretation limitation also applies when the statute has a plain meaning
that has been rejected as unreasonable or absurd and a requirement of specific authorization
exists. Despite rejection of the statute's plain meaning, a rule of specific authorization sug-
gests that a court not interpret the statutory language too broadly.
In either of these two situations, because of the requirement of specific authorization, a
requirement of clear statement is applicable. See note 118 supra.
124. This limitation also applies if, despite invocation of the plain meaning rule, the
plain meaning of the statute is rejected on grounds of absurdity or unfairness. For example,
see notes 209-10 & accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 33
PLAIN MEANING RULE
enough to be interpreted to apply as suggested in the purposes or poli-
cies in the statute's legislative history.1 25 An unreasonable construction
of such words belies legislative intent and serves few positive ends. 126
Exceptions under the Plain Meaning Rule
In addition to these limitations on the plain meaning rule, some
courts have carved out two additional exceptions to a strict use of the
plain meaning rule that follow from the rule's definition. First, the
plain meaning rule by definition does not apply when the statute's plain
meaning would either absurdly contradict other language in the statute
or in related statutes, or produce an absurd result. 127 Some courts will
depart from a statute's plain meaning not only when the meaning con-
tradicts other language in the statute,1 28 but also when giving effect to
that meaning would conflict with what the court perceives as the stat-
ute's purposes or policies.' 29 Second, a court will sometimes depart
from a statute's plain meaning when the plain meaning involves an
absurdity' 30 or when it yields what the court perceives as an unfair or
unreasonable result. 131
These two exceptions to the plain meaning rule are best under-
stood in the context of the expertise and bias of the decisionmaking
authorities. Under the first exception, when the legislature utilizes
court expertise, a court should be free to examine evidence of purposes
125. See DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 198-201 (discussing examples of narrow or broad
interpretation of language consonant with principles under which legislature enacted statute
when the words leave room for such play).
126. Cf. id at 203-04 (when a court reaches a result that is impossible to justify from the
specific working provisions of the statute, it is "cleaner" to view the result as a "common law
rule [running] on a parallel track" rather than as a 'judicial attribution" that has been "en-
grafted on the statute"); Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Ex-
trinsic Evidence, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 601, 612 (1940) ("In cases where the court enlarges a
statutory rule to cover cases not reasonably within it, it is, of course, not 'interpreting' the
statute but saying that the legislature had a good idea which ought to be extended by com-
mon law rules."). If the common law is in conflict with the proposed interpretation, and
thus cannot be justified as common law, the statute should be construed more narrowly than
the sources suggest to be consistent with the statute's words.
127. See note 99 & accompanying text supra.
128. See note 99 & accompanying text supra. See DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 229
(citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889)) (concern expressed as to whether a
contradiction appeared with "other parts of the instrument").
129. DICKERSON, supra note 94, at 231 (citing Hutton v. Phillips, 45 Del. 156, 160, 70
A.2d 15, 17 (1949) (concern expressed about whether the plain meaning is in contradiction
with what is "rational" and what "'makes sense' in [the] context").
130. See note 99 & accompanying text supra. See DICKERSON, supra note 92, at 232:
"[7The presumption against absurdity is strong."
131. Dickerson, supra note 94, at 232: "[Ihe presumptions against unfairness and un-
reasonableness... are usually weak."
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and policies, including those beyond the face of the statute and other
statutes.1 32 Granting courts the ability to determine whether a contra-
diction exists between the plain meaning and these purposes or policies
reflects the legislature's decision to rely on the court's institutional
framework and expertise. Here, the court must be able to inform itself
of all relevant background facts and policies to discharge responsibly
its decisionmaking function. 33 Furthermore, in a utilization statute,
the words employed by the legislature are not likely to be as specific or
as carefully chosen as they would be in a nonutilization statute. 134 In
such statutes, legislatures tend to draft language with greater "open tex-
ture," 35 consistent with the intent in such situations to allow more ac-
tive judicial interpretation.
The policies or purposes used by a court in a utilization situation
derive from two sources. First, and primary, are the policies that ap-
pear on the face of the statute and in legislative history materials, such
as committee reports and remarks by sponsors of the bill or committee
chairpersons on the floor during debate. 136 These policies may include
132. "Utilization" is defined in text accompanying note 87 supra. In initially determin-
ing whether the legislature is seeking to utilize judicial expertise, a court may have to ex-
amine legislative history despite the fact that the plain meaning rule applies. Because the
process of categorizing a statute is independent of particular problems of interpretation that
may arise, the legislative history will not be used to interpret particular language, but rather
to decide whether the legislature has indicated an intent to utilize the courts in enacting the
statute under consideration. Thus, there is little danger that legislative history used by the
judge to categorize the statute will impermissibly influence the resolution of the specific
interpretative task when legislative history use may not be appropriate. In addition, statutes
will come to be categorized as either utilization or nonutilization statutes. Classification of
the statute will then be completely independent of the particular interpretative task before
the court, and legislative history will not demand examination in making this decision.
133. See note 136 infra.
134. This fact can be seen by comparing the statutory language in the statutes used as
examples of utilization situations in notes 78-84 & accompanying text supra to the language
used in nonutilization statutes.
135. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961).
136. These traditional legislative history materials are usually thought inappropriate to
examine once the plain meaning rule is invoked. In dealing with a utilization statute, how-
ever, it makes no sense to assume that the court can fulfill a policy-balancing role if use of
legislative history is prevented. The object of the plain meaning rule should be to set an
orderly framework for inquiry into legislative intent. When no alternative to reliance on
legislative history exists consistent with the ability of a court to make a reasoned decision,
resort to legislative history must be allowed.
Use of legislative history proceeds differently here than if the plain meaning rule were
never adopted. If the statute has no plain meaning, or if the problem was unforeseen, the
court would balance the policies culled from the legislative history to reach a sensible result.
Here, after the court balances the policies, regardless of what appears sensible to the court,
the plain meaning of the statute is definite unless it would yield an absurd or unreasonable
result.
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judicial policies fairly attributable to, although not explicitly expressed
by, the legislature.' 37 Second, the court should also consider specific
policies not addressed by the legislature, especially because the defining
characteristic of a utilization statute is that the legislature intends for
the court to use its own expertise and judgment to resolve the particular
statutory problems before it. 138
Even in this situation, the court cannot interpret the statute freely.
Stated policies appearing in the legislative history or on the face of the
statute must be given primary weight. These policies represent specific
expressions of legislative intent. Additionally, if a utilization statute
has a plain meaning, the court should depart from that meaning only if
an analysis of the policies or purposes of the statute suggest that giving
effect to the plain meaning would yield either an absurd or an unrea-
sonable result.139 In many cases, a court might find that legislative pur-
poses and policies would be better served by an interpretation other
than that derived from the statute's plain meaning. If applying the stat-
ute's plain meaning yields no absurd or unreasonable result, however,
that meaning should be given effect.140
Such a relatively unconstrained interpretation is unwarranted
when the legislature does not utilize judicial expertise. In nonutiliza-
137. Professor Dickerson calls these policies tacit assumptions. DICKERSON, supra note
94, at 198-201, 221-22.
138. This aspect of a judge's role is unique to utilization statutes. Cf. Greenawalt, Dis-
cretion and JudicialDecision: The Elusive Questfor the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 359, 391-98 (1975) (discussing judge's role in terms of decisions that are more so-
cially desirable, reflect shared moral or social standards, or give effect to values peculiar to
the judge or that are shared only by a minority.) When interpreting a nonutilization statute,
a judge should not create statutory policies even if the statute has no plain meaning or even
if the problem before the court was unforeseen by the legislature. In those cases, the court
may use the legislative history to aid its interpretation, but because the legislature has not
delegated the same degree of lawmaking responsibility to the court, the judge's own views of
what might constitute a rational statutory policy should not be permitted to influence the
interpretative task. See also note 140 infra.
139. This is to be contrasted with use of legislative history in which the plain meaning
rule is not applicable. When the plain meaning rule is inapplicable, the judge is free to
adopt his or her own view of the legislature's intent in interpreting the statute. When the
plain meaning rule is applicable, the plain meaning of the statute must be absurd or unrea-
sonable before it can be rejected in favor of a meaning based on policies expressed in the
legislative history. For a discussion of whether the statute must yield absurd results or
merely unreasonable results before the court is free to depart from the statute's plain mean-
ing under the plain meaning rule, see notes 145-47 & accompanying text infra.
140. The distinction between utilization and nonutilization statutes has relevance even if
the statute has no plain meaning. If the plain meaning rule is not applicable to a nonutiliza-
tion statute, legislative history materials may be used, but not the judge's own sense of fair-
ness. That type of judicial balancing is reserved only for utilization statutes, in which use of
judicial expertise and judgment is specifically intended by the legislature.
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tion statutes, the legislature intends that the courts apply the generally
accepted plain meaning of the statute's words, qualified by their con-
text, grammar, and purposes appearing on the face of the statute.' 4'
Courts may assume that the legislature meant only what the plain
meaning of the words convey; cases outside this plain meaning were
not intended to be encompassed by the statutory language. Only con-
tradictions within the enacted text of the statute itself or between the
statute and closely related statutes should justify departure from the
statute's plain meaning. 142 A court would usurp the legislature's pre-
rogative to construct a consistent legislative scheme by either relying
upon unenacted legislative history 143 or construing the statute in light
of judicially created policies. 44 Except when the legislature has de-
cided to utilize judicial expertise, courts should defer to the legislature's
balance of policy interests.
The second exception to the plain meaning rule, which allows de-
parture from the statute's plain meaning when the result would be un-
fair or unreasonable, can be used to ameliorate any potential bias in the
legislative drafting process against politically powerless groups. 145 Po-
litically powerful groups are usually able to ensure that statutes affect-
ing their interests are drafted carefully. When the statute affects the
politically powerful, only an absurd result or an absurd contradiction
with other parts of the statute or related statutes should permit a court
to depart from the statute's plain meaning. 146 When the result yielded
by applying the plain meaning of the statute is unfair to politically
powerful groups, the judge should follow the statute's plain meaning.
Such care in drafting cannot be presumed, however, in statutes af-
fecting politically powerless groups. Thus, the legislature is less likely
141. A court may consider context, basic rules of grammar, purposes stated on the face
of the statute, and special usage to determine the plain meaning of a statute in every case.
See notes 101-104 & accompanying text supra.
142. See note 127 & accompanying text supra. A court can consider closely related stat-
utes to determine contradiction in addition to intrastatute contradictions because closely
related statutes are part of the statute's context. See note 104 & accompanying text supra.
143. See notes 136-37 & accompanying text supra.
144. See note 138 & accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.
146. Departure from the plain meaning of a statute in case of absurdity is the minimal
requirement of all formulations of the plain meaning rule. See note 99 & accompanying text
supra. Absurd results always suggest that the legislature and the lobbying interests affected
by the statute either did not foresee the problem under consideration or erred in drafting.
Resort to legislative history to aid the judge in interpreting the statute sensibly is thus appro-
priate. Results that a judge perceives as only unfair are less reliable evidence that the prob-
lem was unforeseen or an error in drafting was made, especially because a presumption of
care in drafting reasonably exists.
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to have intended that its words have an apparently unfair or unreason-
able result. When the plain meaning of such a statute yields an unfair
or unreasonable result for politically powerless groups, a court should
examine whether or not the legislative history supports such an unrea-
sonable or unfair construction. Thus, the legislature would be aware
that courts will seek evidence of an intent both in the statute and its
legislative history when the statutory scheme appears on its face un-
fairly or unreasonably to affect the politically powerless, but will apply
the generally accepted meaning of the statutory words when the statute
adversely affects groups better able to protect their interests in the
drafting process. 147
147. To determine whether the plain meaning of a statute adversely affects a politically
powerless group, the court should inquire into the effect of the plain meaning on any af-
fected politically powerless group, not just the effect on whatever politically powerless group
is before the court. Two reasons support this requirement. First, to the extent that some
politically powerless group is affected by the statute's plain meaning, a concern with care in
drafting exists whether or not that group is involved in the particular litigation. Second, the
resolution of a statutory interpretation problem should not depend on which particular party
is before the court. If only politically powerless groups before the court were considered,
resolution of the case would depend on which group that was. In one situation the plain
meaning of the statute would only be abandoned if absurd, while in another it would be
abandoned if unfair, depending on whether one of the litigants before the court happened to
be a politically powerless group adversely affected by the plain meaning of the statute. This
could lead to the undesirable result of contradictory interpretations of the same words in the
same statute based only on which group was a party to the case. Consideration of all politi-
cally powerless groups solves this problem.
Thus, if the statute primarily involves politically powerless groups, there is likely to be
some politically powerless group that is adversely affected by the statute's plain meaning. If
so, the unfair or unreasonable standard is appropriate. When the statute primarily affects
politically powerless groups, only a negative effect on a politically powerless group should
justify use of the unfairness or unreasonableness standard. When the plain meaning favors
politically powerless groups at the expense of a politically powerful group, the assumption
should be made that the politically powerful group was able to ensure careful consideration
of its interests in the drafting of the statute. Thus, only an absurd result should justify de-
parture from the statute's plain meaning. See text accompanying note 146 supra & notes
201-02 & accompanying text infra.
In practice, this requirement may operate in another way. It is often more difficult to
have discriminatory legislation passed if the discrimination has to be clearly stated. To the
extent that this requirement imposes upon legislatures an obligation to provide evidence of
intent to affect politically powerless groups adversely both in the statute and its legislative
history, the requirement may make it more difficult to pass such legislation. This could pose
a problem because this Article's theory claims to be neutral regarding what the legislature
wants to pass. See note 92 supra. It does not seem too burdensome, however, to require that
evidence in the statute and the legislative history, taken together, indicate an intent to enact
constitutional but discriminatory legislation adversely affecting politically powerless groups
in order to ensure that the legislature's actual intent is followed in such a situation.
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Four Categories of Statutes under the Plain Meaning Rule
Four categories of statutes, which require different treatment
under the plain meaning rule, derive from these considerations. The
first are nonutilization statutes that do not primarily involve or affect
the politically powerless. Many economic statutes regulating corporate
enterprises provide examples of such statutes. 48 In this category, the
reasons for applying the plain meaning rule are the strongest: the legis-
lature has decided to strike a specific balance of policies and, pressured
by lobbyists, presumably was forced to consider carefully the words
enacted into law.149 Only an absurd contradiction within the statute or
an absurd result in light of the policies stated on the face of the statute
would justify examining legislative history.150
The second category includes utilization statutes that do not pri-
marily involve or affect the politically powerless. The Anti-Injunction
Act is an example of such a utilization statute.' 5' In this situation, the
court should be permitted to interpret the statute in light of the pur-
poses and policies in the legislative history or those purposes and poli-
cies that the court fairly perceives, because Congress intended to utilize
judicial expertise in developing the law.152 Such a statute primarily in-
volves the politically powerful, however, so the words chosen by the
legislature are presumed to reflect accurately its general intent.1 3
Thus, a judge should look beyond the plain meaning only when the
policies or purposes in the legislative history or those perceived by the
judge show that the plain meaning creates an absurd result. If the utili-
zation statute's language is so vague or ambiguous that the statute has
no plain meaning, 54 the plain meaning rule would have no original
application and would not restrain an interpretation based on the pur-
poses underlying the statute. The policies and purposes of the statute
148. See, e.g., Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976); Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343 (1978).
149. This is the definition of a nonutilization statute affecting politically powerful
groups.
150. Any other assumption could allow an unlimited resort to legislative history, with all
the dangers that such an approach presents. See note 115 supra; DICKERSON, supra note 94,
at 137-97. Legislative history will still have been consulted to determine whether the prob-
lem before the court was unforeseen, see note 111 & accompanying text supra, and could be
used in making the initial determination whether the statute is a nonutilization statute, see
note 132 supra. If a definitive answer to the problem is revealed in such a search, that
answer should control. See note 113 & accompanying text supra.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), discussed in note 79 supra.
152. See notes 136-38 & accompanying text supra.
153. See note 146 & accompanying text supra.
154. The Sherman Act's prohibition against "[e]very contract.., in restraint of trade"
is an example of this. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). See note 78 supra.
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thus would control its interpretation without any reference to plain
meaning. 55
The third category includes nonutilization statutes that primarily
involve or affect the politically powerless, such as certain kinds of social
welfare statutes. 5 6 The legislature has determined in these statutes
that it, and not the court, should determine the standards for allocating
limited public funds to those entitled to relief. Therefore, a court
should not interpret the statute in light of the policies or purposes that
are not part of the statute's context. 157 These statutes affect the politi-
cally powerless, however, and great care in drafting cannot be pre-
sumed. Thus, if the plain meaning of the statute yields an unfair or
unreasonable result, legislative history should be examined, because
such a result rebuts the presumption that the legislature intended the
plain meaning to control. 158
The fourth category contains utilization statutes that primarily in-
volve or affect politically powerless groups. Examples include the early
civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in housing or
employment. 159 The rationale for the plain meaning rule in this cate-
gory is least compelling. The legislature has invoked the judiciary's
expertise to resolve the problem, and legislative concern with drafting
is minimal. Thus, a court should rely on purposes or policies suggested
by the legislative history to determine whether or not applying the stat-
ute's plain meaning would produce an unfair or unreasonable result. If
such unfairness or unreasonableness exists, the plain meaning of the
statute should be rejected. 60
A word of caution concerning these four categories of statutes is
necessary. These categories should not be taken to mandate the use of
formulas for solving statutory interpretation problems.' 6' Every statu-
tory interpretation problem is unique. By emphasizing broad consider-
ations of expertise and bias, however, these guidelines can help a judge
to resolve the tension present in every statutory problem between the
statute's words and the statute's purpose or policy.
Examining whether or not a statute is a utilization statute, whether
or not it primarily involves or affects politically powerless groups, and
155. See notes 106-08 & accompanying text supra & note 139 supra.
156. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-662 (1976) (Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
157. See notes 142-44 & accompanying text supra.
158. See note 147 & accompanying text supra.
159. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976) (employment); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619
(1976) (housing).
160. See notes 135-47 & accompanying text supra.
161. The dangers of such an approach are noted in Kernochan, supra note 62, at 344.
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the consequences flowing from these characterizations, should make
judges sensitive to the interpretive task necessary in each case and thus
provide a framework for a nonarbitrary use of legislative history. Simi-
larly, considering whether the statute has a plain meaning, whether the
issue before the court was foreseen by the legislature, whether there is
an applicable rule of specific authorization, and whether the statute's
words permit construction consistent with the purposes or policies of
the statute should reduce the number of instances in which a judge
arbitrarily invokes either the plain meaning rule or the statute's legisla-
tive history to rationalize a result actually reached on other grounds. 62
Structured Statutory Interpretation: The Right of State
Prosecutors to Appeal in Removed Criminal Cases
The theory of statutory interpretation advanced in this Article pro-
vides a framework for determining the right of states to appeal in re-
moved criminal prosecutions and for evaluating the resolution of that
question by the Manypenny opinions. To apply the theory, two federal
statutes must be construed: the general appeals statute, 28 United
States Code section 1291, and the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 United
States Code section 3731.163 State law alone should not govern the
right of states to appeal an adverse ruling in removed criminal
prosecutions. 164
162. A flow chart describing the questions that a judge should ask under this theory of
interpretation, and the consequences of yes or no answers to these questions, appears as
Appendix A.
163. The only relevant federal statutes in this case are § 1291 and § 3731. See Arizona
v. Manypenny, 608 F.2d at 1199-1200, 1201. Cf. note 9 supra (questioning whether the
mandamus statute should apply). In other cases, however, one may ask what other statutes
are potentially relevant. Any potentially relevant statute should be considered in any effort
to determine whether the legislature intended that the statute apply to the case.
164. A commentator recently argued that the right to appeal is "substantive" and there-
fore governed by state law. According to this view, the fact that state statutes authorize the
appeal is in itself sufficient to permit the state to appeal in the federal courts. See Note,
Criminal Appellate Procedure-Conlict of Laws-State Right to Appeal in a Criminal Case
Removed to Federal Court-Arizona v. Manypenny, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1006, 1018.
An analysis of this choice of law issue must begin with the Supreme Court's decision in
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880). The Court noted there that, in actions removed
pursuant to § 643 of the revised statutes (predecessor of § 1442(a)), federal courts should
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Id at 271-72. See also FED. R.
CRIM. P. 54(b)(1), Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules. The balance struck in Davis
between substantive and procedural law is thus similar to that struck in removed civil ac-
tions. See 100 U.S. at 257.
The broad outlines of the distinction between substance and procedure are clear. In
Manypenny, for example, the district court applied the state law of assault, while the proce-
dural aspects of the case were governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 445 F.
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In applying this theory of statutory interpretation, the first ques-
Supp. at 1127. In close cases, such as the right to appeal, attempting to classify the right is
not as easy. See, e.g., 608 F.2d at 1202 n.1 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Furthermore, mechan-
ically classifying the right to appeal as procedural or substantive ignores the nature of the
distinction between substance and procedure in removed civil cases, on which Davis is
grounded, see 100 U.S. at 257, 271-72, and the differences between removed civil cases and
removed criminal prosecutions.
In the traditional removed civil diversity case, some commentators agree that the choice
of whether to apply state or federal law should be made by examining a variety of policies
not strictly relevant to the formal distinction between substance and procedure. Cf. Westen
& Lehman, Is There Lffe for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 314
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Westen & Lehman]; Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Re-
sponse to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959, 960-62 (1980) (agreeing that a
mechanical categorization of rights as substantive or procedural miscomprehends the need
for a policy balance in resolving Erie questions). This agreement exists despite a wide range
of opinions on both the appropriate policies that should be considered and the method that
should be used for blancing them. Compare Westen, After "1ie for Erie"--A Repiy, 78
MICH. L. REv. 971, 975-76 (1980) with Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to
Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959, 964-70 (1980).
In the context of removed criminal cases, adherence to a formal distinction between
substance and procedure is even less appropriate. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652, and the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2702, which help define the distinction in
the civil context, do not apply to criminal cases. Thus, the Rules of Decision Act's mandate
to apply a formal distinction between substance and procedure and the stricter standards
governing rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act are irrelevant. The closest anal-
ogy to these statutes in the criminal setting are Fed. R. App. P. 1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3731,
neither of which expressly distinguishes substance from procedure. Thus, the directive to
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law ultimately rests on the purposes of
the removal statute as indicated in Davisand not, as is perhaps the case in removed civil
actions, on a statutorily-based distinction between substance and procedure. One must in-
clude the word "perhaps" because some commentators have suggested that the Rules of
Decision Act merely states a truism and has no independent force of its own. See Westen &
Lehman, supra at 373. Even if the statute does have independent force, the distinction be-
tween substance and procedure in civil cases is nevertheless the result of examining a wide
range of distinctions, not all of them relevant to a formal distinction between substance and
procedure. In the absence of such a statute, a policy balance is even more appropriate.
Furthermore, the Davis opinion is concerned with affirming principles of federal
supremacy, 100 U.S. at 265-71; thus it is as appropriate under Davis to analyze the choice-
of-law question as are questions involving principles of preemption. Preemption analysis
seeks to determine which federal interests would be affected by the decision to apply federal
law to a particular situation. Following this analogy, the choice-of-law analysis under Davis
would resemble preemption analysis because it would balance the federal interests against
the state's interest in having the law applied to the case. See Westen & Lehman, supra, at
324 n.36: "[Tihe question is precisely the same question one asks under traditional 'preemp-.
tion' analysis."
The choice of state law should not, therefore, be premised on a characterization of the
right to appeal as "substantive." State law controls, if at all, because Congress did not in-
tend the relevant federal statutes to apply. . Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
749-50 (1980) ("[The] first question must therefore be whether the scope of the federal rule
[is intended by Congress] to control the issue before the Court."); Westen & Lehman, supra,
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tion to consider is whether the statute's language is specific enough to
be said to have a plain meaning. 165 Section 1291 provides in broad
terms that appeals may lie from "all final decisions of the district
courts." 166 Although broad, 167 the language of section 1291 does have
a plain meaning: the statute permits appeals from all final decisions of
district court judges, including those of state prosecutors seeking to ap-
peal adverse rulings in criminal cases removed to federal court.
The second question to consider is whether the legislature, in en-
acting the law, anticipated the specific problem before the court. 68
Section 1291 does not suggest that Congress considered the question of
appeals by states in removed criminal prosecutions. 169 Nor is evidence
of the legislature's consideration of this problem found in a review of
at 314-316 (Erie analysis should focus on the question of whether there is a valid federal rule
on the subject).
Federal statutory law controls the issue in Manypenny. This conclusion is supported by
several considerations. First, it would be anomalous to hold that, in criminal trials, Con-
gress intended a defendant's right to appeal to be governed by federal statutes, but did not
intend federal law to define the state prosecutor's right to appeal. Appellate rights in the
federal system are routinely governed by federal statutory law, and Congress has passed
numerous statutes defining appellate rights in the federal courts. The number and scope of
the various statutes suggests a congressional intent that federal law determine appellate
rights in federal courts. This conclusion is strengthened by examining the analogous situa-
tion of civil cases that have been removed to federal court because of diversity jurisdiction.
When a party in such a case seeks appellate review, the appeal is authorized by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and not because the party could appeal a similar order if the case had remained in
the state courts. See generally 39 West's Fed. Prac. Digest 2d, Federal Courts § 584.
Second, congressional lack of attention to a state's appellate rights in removed criminal
actions cannot be equated with an intent to leave those rights to be defined solely by the
states. When silence has given rise to a finding that state law governs, as in Walker, this
finding has been made in light of congressional acquiescence to the application of state rules
in such circumstances. See also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). In
contrast, Congress seems to have occupied the field of appellate rights in the federal courts.
Third, unlike the recent controversy over the Erie doctrine, applying federal law to the
Manypenny problem would not permit the federal courts to develop a large body of substan-
tive common law based only on the authority of a federal grant ofjurisdiction. See Westen
& Lehman, supra, at 364-77; Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and
Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959, 962-66, 968-70 (1980); Westen, After "Life for Erie"--4
Reply, 78 MICH. L. REv. 971, 982-89 (1980). If the right to appeal is found to be controlled
by federal law, federal statutes define the appellate rights of the litigants: wide-rangingjudi-
cial development of federal common law, suggesting that federal law does not control,
would not be implicated. It may make sense for the appellate rights of the government to be
the same in removed criminal cases as they would have been under state law had the case
remained in the state courts. This result, however, should be reached by interpreting rele-
vant federal statutes and common law principles.
165. See notes 108-10 & accompanying text supra.
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). See note 6 supra.
167. See note 110 & accompanying text supra.
168. See note 111 & accompanying text supra.
169. See note 6 supra.
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the relevant legislative history, permitted at this point of analysis to
determine whether the legislature considered the problem before the
court.' 70 Thus, as a preliminary conclusion, the plain meaning rule
would not guide interpretation because the problem before the court
was not foreseen by the legislature. The court therefore should ex-
amine all sources of legislative intent.' 7'
The next question to consider is whether the legislature or the
courts have required specific authorization in this area. If either
branch has imposed a requirement of specific authorization, then the
"narrow plain meaning" of the statute should be applied even though
the specific problem before the court was not foreseen by the legisla-
ture.' 72 If specific authorization is required before government prose-
cutors can appeal, then the court should invoke the plain meaning of
section 1291, recognizing that the word "all," a broad word, cannot be
interpreted to grant specific authorization for government prosecutors
to appeal. 173 So construed, the general appeals act would not authorize
appeals by government prosecutors because the plain meaning of the
statutory language does not specifically refer to appeals by the govern-
ment in criminal cases. This analysis underlies the Court's holding in
United States v. Sanges. 174
It is therefore important to determine whether specific authoriza-
tion under section 1291 is needed for a state prosecutor in a removed
criminal action to appeal from an adverse district court ruling. It is
unpersuasive to argue that the specific authorization required by
Sanges for federal prosecutors to appeal an adverse ruling requires
Congress specifically to authorize states to appeal in removed criminal
proceedings before section 1291 can be interpreted to confer a right to
appeal. Sanges can be distinguished and the purpose underlying the
Sanges rule supports the distinction.' 75
170. See 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS Special Pamphlet (legislative history,
revisers notes, and congressional debates to the Judicial Code, including § 1291, collected).
171. See note 111 & accompanying text sufpra.
172. See notes 120-22 & accompanying text supra.
173. "All" cannot be so interpreted because the purpose underlying the requirement of
specific authorization could be frustrated if broad words were given their general plain
meaning. See notes 120-22 & accompanying text supra.
174. 144 U.S. 310 (1892). See notes 8-9, 18-23 & accompanying text supra.
175. Because of the conclusion that specific federal authorization under § 1291 is not
required for a state prosecutor to appeal in a removed criminal prosecution, it is unnecessary
to discuss in depth how § 1291 would be interpreted to deny appellate rights in the event
specific authorization were required. Generally, the interpretation would be as follows:
(I) Because specific authorization is required, the narrow plain meaning rule should be
used. See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra. (2) Section 1291 should then be catego-
rized as one of four types of statutes under the plain meaning rule. See text accompanying
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The prosecuting entity in Sanges was the United States. When the
prosecuting entity is the United States, Congress appropriately may
strike the balance between the individual interests and the government
interests involved in the criminal appeals process 176 by specifying when
a federal prosecutor may appeal. When the prosecuting entity is a
state, however, the state legislature has the strongest interest in deciding
when accurate and thorough enforcement of state laws mandates that
the state prosecutor be allowed to appeal an adverse ruling. 177 If the
notes 148-60 supra. (3) Section 1291 would appear to be a utilization statute whose plain
meaning does not detrimentally affect a politically powerless group. Thus, one could con-
sider legislative history and the judge's own sense of fairness to determine if the result in
applying the plain meaning is absurd. See text accompanying notes 151-53 supra. (4) Such
an inquiry would lead to the conclusion that the plain meaning is absurd, for reasons similar
to the analysis of § 3731. See text accompanying notes 203-10 infra. (5) The narrow plain
meaning of § 1291 would be rejected, and § 1291 would be narrowly interpreted in light of
its words, legislative history, and the judge's own sense of fairness, a right to appeal being
implied only if these sources clearly indicate it exists. See note 123 supra and similar analy-
sis applied to § 3731 in note 210 infra. (6) Two grounds then would exist for interpreting
§ 1291 not to grant the right to appeal: (a) one can get no clear statement from those
sources, and (b) the word "all," once restricted from being interpreted broadly, could not be
interpreted specifically to authorize states' appeals. See note 126 & accompanying text
supra. Cf. Arizona v. Manypenny, 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1672 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Ic]lear statutory mandate must exist to find jurisdiction") (citing Carroll v. United States,
354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957)).
176. The common law rule requiring specific authorization for government appeals in-
terposes the legislature between the individual defendant and the government prosecutor.
See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1975). The government usually possesses
more litigation resources than does a criminal defendant. If it is permitted to appeal adverse
decisions and retry defendants after a successful appeal, the costs to individual defendants,
both in time and money, can be substantial. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See general,
United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980). Such power may be used by prosecu-
tors to harass particular defendants. The double jeopardy clause was designed to prevent
such results; however, many government appeals that do not offend the clause also produce
such results. See general, United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339-51 (1975).
In response, the courts have demanded that the legislature must specifically address the
issue and authorize the kind of appeal the government seeks before a federal or state prose-
cutor is permitted to impose the burden of appeal and possible retrial on a defendant. See
notes 19-20 & accompanying text supra. If the legislature passed the statute under which the
defendant is being prosecuted, it is accountable to the class of people of which the defendant
is a member and it is responsible for regulating the activity of the executive branch, includ-
ing the prosecutor. Specific authorization reflects a specific legislative determination that the
burden imposed on defendants by permitting the government to appeal is justified by the
benefits of correcting erroneous lower court decisions hindering fair enforcement of the
laws. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
177. When the appropriate legislative body has authorized the state to appeal, and when
the double jeopardy clause is not violated, there is nothing peculiar about state prosecutors
acting as appellants in federal court. The state in such a situation is just like any other party
seeking to appeal from an adverse decision. As long as a federal statute generally authorizes
government prosecutors to appeal adverse decisions, more specific federal authorization for
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state legislature has authorized a criminal appeal by state prosecutors
appeals in criminal cases should not be required. Therefore, the general appeals statute,
§ 1291, should be sufficient federal authorization for the state's right to appeal in removed
criminal cases.
This conclusion follows from a two-step reasoning process. First, absent a requirement
of specific authorization, the language of § 1291 clearly permits the state to appeal in re-
moved criminal cases. See notes 165-67 & accompanying text supra. Second, the specific
authorization requirement should be satisfied when the state legislature has passed a statute
that would authorize the state to appeal if the case had remained in state courts.
This analysis assumes that the question of whether a state can appeal in its own state
courts is governed by statutory law. If the state's right of appeal is grounded in a common
law right, then the policy underlying the Sanges rule of having the legislature specifically
authorize the kind of appeal the government may seek in criminal cases would not be satis-
fied. In such a case, the argument that § 1291 should be sufficient authorization for the
state's right to appeal in criminal cases in which the state had a right in its own state courts is
weaker.
As a practical matter, this is not a real concern. Only two states, North Carolina and
Maryland, were noted in Sanges as having a common law rule permitting a state to appeal
in criminal cases. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 316-17. Only two additional
states, Connecticut and Pennsylvania, were mentioned in a 1957 commentary. Note, Crimi-
nalProcedure-Right of State to Appeal, 45 Ky. L. REV. 628, 628 (1957). Each of these four
states now has statutory law on point. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96; MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1445; PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19 § 1188 (Purdon).
Theoretically, as long as only a few states have a common law appellate right, it seems
doctrinally rational to permit state appeals in removed criminal actions as long as the state
could appeal in its own state courts, whether or not specific authorization is present. The
legislatures in those states can be said to have approved sub silentio the common law right to
appeal. This result avoids the anomalous decision to deny a few states the right to appeal,
and prevents friction between the federal government and the states that would be caused by
a federal rule mandating state legislative action before a right in the federal courts could be
granted. Furthermore, as most, if not all, state legislatures have passed statutes on point,
thereby indicating that legislative inertia is not a problem in this area, it is reasonable to
assume that those legislatures that have not acted in the face of common law rules have
acquiesced in those rules. This analysis responds to Justice Brennan's disagreement with the
niajority's finding a right to appeal in Arizona's statute. Justice Brennan stated that the
Arizona statute was not sufficiently precise to fit the Sanges test. 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1671-72
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Sanges Court implicitly adopted this position by basing its holding on the narrow
proposition that Congress had not indicated an intent to extend appeal rights to the United
States. 144 U.S. at 323. Dissenting in Mfanypenny, Justice Brennan argued that the dictum
in Sanges, as interpreted in Maryland v. Soper (No. 1), 270 U.S. 9 (1926), is considerably
broader. In Soper, the Court concluded, based on Sanges, that a judgment of acquittal was
unreviewable. Justice Brennan argued that this result was based on the Court's conclusion
that no express federal statutory authority for review existed, despite the fact that the prede-
cessor of § 1291 was available. Such a conclusion would quite obviously undermine the
majority's analysis of§ 1291 in ,anypenny. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 101 S. Ct. at 1670-
71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority in Manypenny rejected this interpretation of So-
per. It concluded that Soper's holding of no appellate right rested on an understanding of
existing double jeopardy law. To support this inference, the majority relied on Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1902), which had assumed that the double jeopardy clause was
applicable to the states and thus would have prevented an appeal in Soper. 101 S. Ct. at
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in the state court system, all the policies that support the rule in Sanges
are satisfied. 78
Finally, as the precise problem was unforeseen by the legislature
and no specific federal authorization is required, the fourth question in
this analysis of section 1291 is whether the statute's words are suffi-
ciently broad to be interpreted to apply to this unforeseen case, thus
allowing the court to reach a sensible result consistent with the statute's
words, purposes, and policies, as indicated by the statute and its legisla-
tive history. 17 9 The statute provides for appeals from "all final deci-
sions." The word "all" is broad enough to permit appeals from any
adverse decision, including the adverse decision involved in
Manypenny.
Permitting appeals from any adverse decision has obvious virtues.
A state prosecutor should not be penalized because of the federal de-
fendant's decision to remove a criminal case to a district court. It
should be as possible to correct on appeal errors in the conduct of a
trial by a federal district court as to correct errors if the case had re-
mained in a state court. The main purpose of the removal statute is to
assure defendants the neutrality of a federal forum: this neutrality is
preserved under this solution. The decision of defendant federal offi-
cials to remove a case should not result in a windfall unrelated to the
1667 n.25. Justice Brennan rejected this conclusion, arguing on the basis of Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), decided eleven years after Soper, that the double jeopardy
clause did not apply to the states. Id at 1670-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The majority's reliance on an inference from Dreyer to explain Soper, appears more
persuasive than Justice Brennan's analysis, which assumed the Soper court prefigured the
Palko rule by eleven years. Soper therefore appears not to stand as precedent for a broader
interpretation of Sanges.
178. See note 176 & accompanying text supra.
The Ninth Circuit majority in Manypenny rejected this solution, suggesting that such an
interpretation of § 1291 would amount to adopting a federal common law rule permitting
state appeals. 608 F.2d at 1200. Perhaps the majority reached its conclusion because, until
Manypenny, the problem under consideration had not been addressed at length by any
court. See note 13 & accompanying text supra. Thus, permitting the appeal might have
been based on a judicially created rule rather than on a federal statute.
The source of the state's right to appeal, however, is § 1291, not federal common law.
See notes 165-67 & accompanying text supra. Thus, the state's right to appeal in criminal
cases removed to federal court depends on the content of state law because the federal com-
mon law rule of specific authorization should be interpreted in the manner described above.
The appellate right rests on statutory law.
179. See notes 124-26 & accompanying text supra. Under a strict analysis, one should
first ask whether or not the statute is a utilization statute. If it is, not only the statute and its
legislative history, but also the judge's own sense of fairness could guide resolution of the
case. See note 138 & accompanying text supra. Whatever the standard, the result would be
to interpret § 1291 to permit appeal rights whenever specific state authorization for criminal
appeals exists.
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purposes justifying removal. 1 80 The balance of federalism is also main-
tained by this solution: the state is permitted to implement its policy of
protecting more citizens by authorizing government appeals in criminal
cases, while the federal government protects its officers against the pos-
sibility of bias in a state forum by allowing removal to a district court.
Interpreting Section 3731
The first question to consider in interpreting section 3731 is
whether the statute's language is specific enough to be said to have a
plain meaning. Section 3731 provides that, in criminal actions in dis-
trict courts, "the United States may appeal as long as the appeal does
not violate the double jeopardy clause."' 8 ' The statute clearly has a
plain meaning: the language would prevent states from appealing be-
cause only "the United States" may appeal.' 82
The second question to consider is whether the specific problem
before the court was foreseen by the legislature enacting the statute.
Neither the language of the statute itself nor the legislative history sug-
gest that, in enacting section 3731, Congress considered the question of
appeals by states in removed criminal prosecutions.8 3 In the prelimi-
nary analysis, therefore, the plain meaning of the statute would not
control.
The third question to consider is whether or not specific federal
authorization in this area is required before the right or duty can be
imposed. As section 1291 would have afforded a basis for appeal if
specific federal authorization were not required, this discussion as-
sumes that specific federal authorization is required.1 84 Thus, although
180. The policies underlying removal are, in general, to provide a neutral forum for
resolution of federal defenses and to avoid harassment of federal officials. See note 35
supra. Neither of these policies is advanced by denying state prosecutors a chance to appeal
adverse trial court rulings to a federal court of appeals. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 608
F.2d 1197, 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 101 S. Ct. 1657, 1664-65.
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). See note 2 supra.
182. See 608 F.2d at 1199. It is assumed here that the plain meaning of § 3731 denies
the state the right to appeal. Arguably, however, the plain meaning of § 3731 can be inter-
preted to permit appeals. See note 5 supra & note 202 infra.
183. 608 F.2d at 1199; id at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
184. As § 3731 specifically addresses the question of appellate rights in criminal cases,
the same type of argument coupling express state statutory authority with general authoriza-
tion under § 1291 is not possible under § 3731. Thus, as assumed here, specific federal au-
thorization under § 3731 is probably necessary. See generall, United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975).
If no specific authorization were required, the plain meaning of § 3731 would not con-
trol. Interpretation without regard to the statute's plain meaning clearly favors permitting
an appeal. See notes 203-08 & accompanying text ifra.
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the legislature did not foresee the problem, the plain meaning rule
should be applied. 185 A court should apply the narrow plain meaning
of the statute as the statute's plain meaning because the specific author-
ization requirement constrains interpretation by the courts. 186 As the
specific words to be interpreted in section 3731 are "the United
States"-words not capable of including within their "plain meaning"
individual states-in section 3731 the normal plain meaning and the
narrow plain meaning are the same. 187
The next step is to determine into which of the four broad catego-
ries outlined above section 3731 falls. 188 The original Appeals Act was
the subject of extensive congressional debate and government appeals
were initially limited to a narrow category of cases, 18 9 thus suggesting
that Congress may not have intended to utilize judicial expertise. The
1971 amendment to the Act, however, permits all appeals that can be
maintained consistently with the Constitution. 190 This structure, mak-
ing a yardstick of the Constitution, is typical of a statute in which judi-
cial expertise is utilized. By developing the double jeopardy clause, the
courts determine the limits of the government's appellate rights.' 9'
Although Congress may not have considered the states' right to
appeal under section 3731,192 problems of federalism are suggested by
this question of the states' right to appeal. 193 In other situations in
which problems of federalism exist, the legislature often has enacted
statutes that seem to delegate to the courts the task of developing the
law. 194 On the other hand, both the longstanding common law rule of
specific authorizition, which is presumed to apply,195 and the fact that
185. See note 120 & accompanying text supra.
186. See notes 121-22 & accompanying text supra.
187. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
188. See notes 148-60 & accompanying text supra.
189. 608 F.2d at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. Id
191. Another example of this structure is the law of in personam jurisdiction. When a
state statute permits jurisdiction to the full extent of the due process clause of the 14th
amendment, courts develop the boundaries of personal jurisdiction.
192. See note 183 & accompanying text supra.
193. See 608 F.2d at 1200; id at 1201 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Note, CriminalAppellate
Procedure-Conflict of Laws-State Right to Appeal in a Criminal Case Removed to Federal
Court-Arizona v. Manypenny, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1006, 1007-09.
194. Examples of such statutes include the Anti-Injunction Act, see note 79 supra, law
relating to ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, see note 83 supra, and state action exemptions
to the antitrust laws, see note 82 supra.
195. Rarely does a requirement of specific authorization exist while a legislative intent
to utilize court expertise can be divined. A requirement of specific legislative authorization
suggests that the legislature, not the courts, should have exclusive decisionmaking power.
Nevertheless, the two situations are not mutually exclusive, as shown by the issue of the
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federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction' 96 might suggest that the
legislature did not intend to utilize court expertise in this situation.
Other jurisdictional statutes, however, such as the Anti-Injunction Act
or rules governing ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, indicate that
Congress has, in similar situations, intended to utilize judicial exper-
tise. 197 Because of congressional intent in similar situations, and be-
cause of section 3731's provision for liberal construction,'9 8 it is likely
that Congress intended to utilize some degree of judicial expertise to
determine sensibly section 373 I's jurisdictional scope. 199
The next inquiry is whether the disputed statutory interpretation
primarily involves or affects a politically powerless group.2°° The
group adversely affected by the plain meaning of the statute is state
prosecutors.20' State prosecutors and the executive branches of state
governments are not a politically powerless group. They should be
able to ensure that their interests receive explicit consideration by
Congress.
Thus, section 3731 utilizes judicial expertise and, as applied to
state prosecutors, does not affect a politically powerless group. Accord-
ingly, the next question to ask is whether the statute's plain meaning,
that only the United States may appeal, produces an absurd result in
light of other parts of the statute and its purposes and policies as re-
vealed by the statute's legislative history.202
right to appeal. In such a case, the court has the freedom of interpretation granted under a
utilization statute, but the court's freedom is limited to the extent that the requirement of
specific authorization mandates an adoption of the narrow plain meaning of the statute un-
less, according to the purposes or policies of the statute as revealed by the statute's context,
legislative history, and judicially invoked policies, such an interpretation would be absurd or
unreasonable. Furthermore, if such an interpretation is absurd or unreasonable, a narrow
interpretation of the statute in light of the statute's context, legislative history, and judicially
invoked policies should be adopted. See note 123 supra.
196. U.S. CONST. art. III.
197. See notes 79-83 supra. The view that standing issues also involve utilizations, see
note 84 supra, further undercuts the argument that the limited jurisdiction of the federal
courts indicates that no utilization is being made in such circumstances.
198. See note 31 supra.
199. Furthermore, if this conclusion is faulty, Congress could so indicate by amending
the statute to deny utilization authority. Such an indication would apply to all later cases
under the Criminal Appeals Act, not merely to one decision.
200. See notes 92-98 & accompanying text supra.
201. Prosecutors are the affected group here because they are negatively affected by the
predetermined plain meaning of the statute. See note 147 supra.
202. See notes 151-55 & accompanying text supra. At nearly every stage of the analysis
outlined above, the proper approach would be to examine broadly the purpose and policy of
the relevant statutes, even though the role that the purpose and policy play in the interpreta-
tive process may differ. Whether the plain meaning rule is thought not to apply because the
issue of states' appellate rights was not considered by Congress and the requirement of spe-
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The basic policy of section 3731 is to prevent erroneous trial court
rulings from thwarting lawful prosecutions. 20 3 This policy applies with
equal force whether the state or the United States is the prosecutor.20 4
Furthermore, the 1971 amendments to section 3731 were designed to
expand the government's right to appeal to the broadest limits consis-
tent with the double jeopardy clause.20 5 The removal statute had its
genesis in early efforts by state courts, prosecutors, and citizens to un-
dermine federal officers' attempts to carry out federal laws, especially
the revenue laws. 20 6 Removal was designed to provide a neutral forum
for adjudicating cases involving federal defenses by officers acting pur-
suant to their authority. The goal was not to give federal officers new
rights or to skew the outcome of any case commenced in state courts,
but rather to obtain a fair and efficient adjudication of such cases in a
forum that minimized the likelihood of errors caused by bias.20 7 Per-
mitting appeals would allow the state to implement its legitimate policy
of protecting state citizens, while the federal government could con-
tinue to protect its officers against the possibility of bias in a state fo-
rum. Removal also was intended to allow utilization of the federal
judges' expertise in resolving defenses based on federal law. 20 8
Evaluated in light of these policies and the plain meanings of sec-
tions 3731 and 1442(a), denying the state the right to appeal under sec-
tion 3731 in removed prosecutions would create an absurdity in the
statutory scheme. 20 9 When a federal officer commits a flagrant crime
against a state citizen and then proceeds to remove the ensuing litiga-
tion, the state would be deprived of the jurisdiction to try a case in its
own courts and at the same time would lose any right to appeal that it
cific authorization is inapplicable to appeals by states in removed criminal proceedings, or
despite the fact that the plain meaning rule applies Congress can be thought to have utilized
judicial expertise in the area of appellate rights in criminal cases, purpose and policy argu-
ments derived from the statute's legislative history are appropriate to use. Even if one con-
cluded that the Criminal Appeals Act was a nonutilization statute, policies derived from the
statute's context, such as liberal construction or policies reflected in the removal statute that
are part of the Criminal Appeals Act's background facts of which judicial notice can be
taken, could be used to determine the statute's plain meaning. These policies suggest that
even the plain meaning of § 3731 would be to construe "United States" to include state and
territorial prosecutors. See note 5 supra. But see note 182 & accompanying text supra.
203. 608 F.2d at 1200 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204. Id
205. See note 26 & accompanying text supra. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
337-39 (1975).
206. See Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 262, 268-69 (1879).
207. See Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-07 (1969).
208. Id at 406-07.
209. Indeed, the result may be so arbitrary that it violates the equal protection cause.
See note 11 supra.
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would have had under state law. This result seems sufficiently absurd,
beyond the point of being merely unfair or unreasonable, to justify de-
parture from the plain meaning rule. Thus, the plain meaning of the
statute should be rejected, and the words of the statute should be con-
strued to permit state prosecutors to appeal from adverse district court
rulings. 210
If the plain meaning of the statute has been rejected, the final
question is whether the words of the statute are sufficiently broad to be
interpreted to apply to the unforeseen case without contradicting the
purposes and policies of the statute. Again, without undue strain, the
term "United States" can be interpreted to include any government
prosecutor prosecuting a criminal case in a federal district court.
A number of federal analogies support this conclusion. The first is
Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.21' Rule 54 pro-
vides that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to criminal
prosecutions removed from state courts to federal district courts.212
Thus, the many provisions in which the rules refer to the "United
States" or an "attorney for the government" also apply to state prosecu-
tors in removed criminal actions.213
Another instance in which a jurisdiction statute phrased in terms
of one government entity has been held to apply to another government
210. The requirement mandated by the fact of specific authorization, see note 123 supra,
is probably met in this situation. The nature of the policies at stake and the incongruity of a
contrary result suggest that even this strict standard for finding a right to appeal can be met.
See text accompanying notes 206-10 supra. This standard, however, is obviously stricter
than that necessary to find a right under § 1291 if no specific congressional authorization is
deemed necessary. Thus, it may be easier to find a right to appeal under § 1291 than under
§ 3731. See also text accompanying notes 219-25 infra.
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 54(b)(1).
212. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 54, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. Rule 54(c) also
states that the phrase "attorney for the government" means not only United States attorneys
and their assistants, but also "the Attorney General of Guam or such other [authorized]
persons... by the laws of Guam." The use of the phrase "attorney for the government" to
include other territorial prosecutors, however, has been limited. But see In re Holovachka,
317 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 1963) (state attorney general held not to be an "attorney for the
government" under FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)).
213. Rule 54 cannot be made the foundation of the argument that, as Congress was
aware in drafting the Federal Rules that states were sometimes in federal court as prosecu-
tors, the failure to mention states in § 3731 indicates an affirmative intent to deny states the
right to appeal in such cases. The absence of congressional consideration of the rights of
states to appeal in removed criminal prosecutions when § 3731 was amended in 1971 rebuts
this argument. See note 184 & accompanying text supra. Moreover, the drafters of Rule 54
were apparently not fully aware of the steps necessary to define the procedures that apply in
removed criminal prosecutions. Ostensibly because of careless drafting, although rule 54
provides that rules of criminal procedure apply to cases removed from state courts, it does
not include state prosecutors under its definition of an "attorney for the government."
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entity is found in Examining Board v. Flores de Otero .2 14 In Flores, the
Supreme Court held that an action against Puerto Rican officials could
be brought under the jurisdictional provision of the Civil Rights Act, 2'5
which gives district courts jurisdiction over suits to redress the depriva-
tion of federal constitutional rights under color of state law.21 6 The
Court noted the congressional intent to include Puerto Rico within the
reach of 28 United States Code section 1983, and concluded that the
jurisdictional analogy to that section should be held to encompass Pu-
erto Rico despite its specific reference only to states.21 7 Although the
situation in Flores differs in some respects from that in Manypenny, it
suggests that, when policies favor such an interpretation, as in Many-
penny, the Court has been willing to construe language naming one
kind of governmental entity to include others. 21 8
Consistency of the Statutory Scheme
As both section 1291 and section 3731 can be interpreted to permit
state prosecutors to appeal, a final question arises concerning the coher-
ence and consistency of the statutory scheme. Only as a last resort
should a court allow its interpretation of two statutes, enacted by the
same legislature, to produce inconsistent results.21 9 Section 3731, how-
ever, if interpreted to apply to states, would authorize appeals in many
instances in which the applicable state law combined with section 1291
would not.220 A proper approach to statutory interpretation must take
this apparent anomaly into account. The question must be asked
whether contradictory appellate rights under the two statutes may per-
missibly be inferred.
Interpreting section 3731 to apply to states requires a finding that a
contrary conclusion would produce an absurd result.22' If, however,
214. 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). But see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418
(1973) (District of Columbia is not a "State or Territory" within the meaning of § 1983).
216. 426 U.S. at 582-86.
217. This conclusion is supported by Rule 8 1(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides that "[wihen the word 'state' is used, it includes, if appropriate, the District
of Columbia." FED. R. Civ. P. 81(e).
218. See note 104 & accompanying text supra.
219. Appellate rights would exist under § 3731 in all cases in which it would be consis-
tent with the double jeopardy clause to grant them, while they would only exist under § 1291
when state law permits. State laws vary in the extent to which they permit government
appeals in criminal cases. See note 10 supra.
220. See text accompanying note 202 supra.
221. Appeal rights that are greater in federal than in state court would occur whenever
state law did not permit appellate rights to the extent permitted by the double jeopardy
clause.
[Vol. 33
appellate jurisdiction is premised on the combined effect of state law
and section 1291, grounding jurisdiction under section 3731 creates
more problems under the removal statutes than it solves. A federal
defendant contemplating removal may hesitate to remove if a right to
appeal is found under section 3731 because the prosecutor may have a
greater opportunity to prolong the proceedings through appeal in fed-
eral courts than he or she would have under state law.222 No strong
policy exists to favor state prosecutors at the expense of federal defend-
ants. When a state legislature has concluded that a defendant should
not be subject to appeals by the state in certain classes of cases, no
strong federal interest justifies overriding this determination. If juris-
diction instead exists under section 1291, the absurd result of interpret-
ing section 3731 not to include states disappears. 223
In contrast, the analysis of the specific authorization requirement
on which section 1291's authorization to appeal rests does not materi-
ally depend on considerations of propriety affected by the existence of
an appellate right under section 3731.224 This interpretation of Sanges
rests on the underlying requirement that the relevant sovereign entity
consider the question of whether to allow criminal appeal rights. Inter-
pretation of section 1291 thus does not depend on whether denying a
right of appeal under the section would produce absurd conclusions in
light of the federal statutory scheme. Therefore, appellate rights exist
under section 1291 without regard to the rights found to exist under
section 3731.
Regardless of the result under section 3731, section 1291 autho-
rizes state appeals when specific authorization exists at the state level.
In contrast, section 3731 can be interpreted to grant states the right to
appeal only if denying this right produces an absurd result. As section
1291 authorizes appeals, it is not absurd to deny such a right under
section 3731. An interpretation of the two statutes is harmonized by
granting states appellate rights under section 1291 but denying them
222. Arguably, Congress has an interest in specifying a uniform national standard even
though a uniform standard may cause appellate rights of the parties to differ from state to
federal forums. Despite this argument, once a right of appeal is found under § 1291, the
plain meaning of § 3731 does not seem to yield an absurd result, which would justify depar-
ture from its plain meaning.
223. See text accompanying notes 172-78 supra. Cf. 101 S. Ct. at 1665-68, n.27 (appel-
late jurisdiction exists under § 1291 plus state law; applicability of § 3731 to the states not
decided).
224. The Supreme Court specifically refused to address this question in Manyfpenny.
See 101 S. Ct. at 1665 n.18. The Court did note the problem with basing jurisdiction on
§ 3731 in light of the removal statute discussed above. Compare id with text accompanying
notes 222-23 supra.
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under section 3731. Therefore, a state's argument that section 3731
grants it the same appeal rights as those granted the United States
should be rejected.22 5
The Court's Opinions as Examples of Statutory Interpretation
Proper techniques of statutory interpretation support the conclu-
sion that states have the right to appeal in removed criminal prosecu-
tions under 28 United States Code section 1291. The Supreme Court
therefore properly resolved the issue before it in Manypenny by finding
a state's right to appeal based on section 1291. More important than
the Court's conclusion, however, is its approach to statutory
interpretation.
In Manypenny, the Court did not follow an obvious framework for
interpreting the relevant federal statutes. Although a court cannot con-
struct an entirely new framework in each opinion, its statutory interpre-
tation should be reasoned. The choice of invoking a purposive
analysis, rather than adopting the statute's plain meaning, should be
explained. 22 6
The Court's majority opinion nevertheless followed fairly closely
an analysis similar to that suggested in this Article. Analyzing section
1291, it first observed that the plain meaning of section 1291 provides
that "any litigant armed with a final judgment from a lower federal
court is entitled to take an appeal. ' 227 It then noted that section 129 1's
language does not specifically address the question of state prosecutors'
appeal rights in removed criminal actions.2 28 The Court then ad-
dressed the question whether, despite the broad statutory language,
other doctrines, such as a requirement of specific authorization, con-
strained a broad interpretation. Although the rule of specific authori-
zation laid down in Sanges might be thought such a constraint, the
Court stated that the policies underlying the Sanges doctrine did not
support its application to Manypenny.229 Noting that its interpretation
of section 1291 and Sanges was supported by the purposes of the re-
225. See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
226. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1665 with text accompanying notes 165-67 supra.
227. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1665 with text accompanying notes 168-70 supra. The Court
then considered more broadly the purposes and policies of the general appeals act with
respect to criminal appeals. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1665 with text accompanying note 171
supra.
228. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1665-67, discussed in notes 44-47 & accompanying text supra,
with text accompanying notes 172-78 supra.
229. This Article also suggests that this question is relevant. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1664,
1668 with text accompanying note 180 supra.
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moval statutes,2 0 the Court concluded, by implication, that its inter-
pretation of section 1291 did not impermissibly or unreasonably
construe the words of section 1291.231
Because it addressed section 1291 first, the Court did not have to
decide whether section 3731 would also permit the state's appeal. The
Court thus was not forced to address the problem raised by the "plain
meaning" of section 3731. The Court noted, however, the possible de-
terrent to a defendant's decision to seek removal if section 3731 were
interpreted to permit a state to appeal even if an appeal would not be
permitted under state law. 3 2 As this Article notes, a court might con-
clude that the plain meaning of section 3731 is not absurd because of
the possible deterrence to a defendant if section 3731 permitted an ap-
peal in federal court that would not be permitted in state court, and
therefore might be constrained from using that section to support state
appeal rights.23
Section 3731 was addressed more directly by Justice Stevens in
concurrence and by Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent. Both
opinions stated that the plain meaning of section 3731 does not permit
appeals by state prosecutors.3 4 Neither opinion, however, addressed
the further question of whether, because of the anomalous result of dis-
allowing appeals under section 3731, the plain meaning of the statute is
sufficiently absurd or unreasonable that it should be rejected. The
opinions therefore did not address fully whether the language "the
United States" in section 3731 can be extended to include state prose-
cutors consistently with the statute's policies.23 5
Similarly, Justice Brennan's approach to interpreting the Sanges
doctrine departed from the approach suggested in this Article. Justice
Brennan interpreted Sanges to require an express authorization for ap-
peals by the legislature that regulates the jurisdiction of the court in
which the case is being prosecuted. Justice Brennan provided no per-
suasive reason why the rule of express authorization should be so inter-
preted, however, and the existence of such a reason is not obvious. The
dissent did not realize that, unless a good reason exists for requiring
230. Compare 101 S. Ct. at 1669 with text accompanying note 179 supra.
231. 101 S. Ct. at 1665 n.18.
232. See text accompanying notes 221-25 supra.
233. See 101 S. Ct. at 1669 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 1669 n.4 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
234. Id at 1669 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see notes 48-49 supra.
235. This failure to address the purpose of the specific authorization requirement is sur-
prising because Justice Brennan has often relied on underlying purposes for an interpreta-
tion of statutes or doctrines. See note 60 supra.
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specific authority for a party to appeal, Congress has expressed an in-
tention in section 1291 to permit all parties to appeal in the federal
courts. When the purposes of the specific authorization rule are satis-
fied, as in the majority's disposition, it is unnecessary to insist, as did
the dissent, that Congress specifically address the problem of states' ap-
peal rights in the federal courts.236
Conclusion
In ,4rizona v. Manypenny, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of whether a state prosecutor could appeal an adverse decision by a
district court judge in a criminal case that had been removed to the
federal courts pursuant to 28 United States Code section 1442(a). A
divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that in such circumstances the
state prosecutor had no right of appeal, thus creating the anomalous
result that a state prosecutor in a case removed to federal district court
could not appeal even if an appeal was allowed according to state law.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, basing a
right of appeal on section 1291.
In reaching these results, both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions of the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court inadvertently emphasized
the need for a principled approach to questions relating to the adoption
and use of the plain meaning rule. The basic difference between the
majority and dissent at both the appellate and Supreme Court level was
in their different approach to questions of plain meaning. None of the
opinions, however, offered principled reasoning for the use or rejection
of the plain meaning rule. This Article has attempted to redress this
problem by developing a structured approach to the rule's use.
This Article has focused on the proper use of extrinsic interpreta-
tive aids to reach results different from those indicated by the statute's
plain meaning. The theory of statutory interpretation proposed here to
guide the resolution of problems of interpretation under the plain
meaning rule is complex. Any simpler approach, however, would
probably not suffice. Structuring the use of legislative history materials
to frame a principled search for legislative intent and to achieve a sen-
sible balance between the judicial and legislative lawmaking functions
involves many considerations. An approach that ignores such consid-
erations would substitute a pleasing simplicity for the recognition that
questions of statutory interpretation often are complex.
236. See note 180 supra.
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